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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
.Public relations depends upon effective
communications. Effective communication is used
to educate, to Inform, to persuade, and to Influ-
ence Various target publics. Instruments of commun-
ication may assume many forms. This study is con-
cerned with one form—the magazine.
The Naval Aviation Safety Center is faced
with a formidable communications problem. Naval
Aviation has become one of the keystones of our
national security, representing a multi-billion
dollar Investment . in equipment, aircraft, and
trained personnel. Yet aviation in the jet-age,
especially Naval Aviation, remains dreadfully un-
forgiving of the slightest mistake.
For these reasons, an intensive and effect-
ive effort is required in aviation safety communica-
tion. Personnel must be educated, new techniques
must be disseminated, hazards must be publicized,
and procedures must be constantly reviewed. All
require the use of printed media. All must reach
the intended target public in order to be effective,

Approach , the Naval Aviation Safety Center's
monthly magazine, is its prime method of communication
about aviation safety with all aviation personnel.
The mission it performs is considered so vital that
the magazine is distributed free of charge to all
Naval Aviation activities at the rate of one copy
for each ten men assigned. Each month, approximately
24,000 copies of Approach are circulated worldwide
to units of the Fleet.
But is Approach an effective instrument of
communication? This, in essence, was the problem
attacked by this study.
Two important questions demanded answers.
Is the magazine designed to fulfill the stated goals
of its publishers? Does material designed to be
read by a specific target public actually reach that
public?
In attempting to solve this problem, a study
method was designed, as described in Chapter 2,
which would result in a measurement of communication
effectiveness through a series of comparisons.
First, a content analysis of Approach was
conducted. This analysis, both quantitative and
qualitative, was to determine such factors as:
1. The types of material appearing in
Approach as to subject category.
2. The relative balance between categories
of material published.

33, The specific target publics for which
the material in the various categories
was designed.
4. The "tone" or "personality" of the mag-
azine*
A second phase of the study involved a
nationwide survey of Approach readership in an effort
to determine whether the material designed for a
target public was being read by that public. The
survey determined whether respondents (a non-
probability sample of 550 pilots, aircrewmen and
maintenance personnel) read the categories which
constitute the majority of the magazine content.
Data resulting from the content analysis and
the readership survey was analyzed and compared to
answer the questions raised, and to evaluate the
communication effectiveness of Approach
.
A measurement was thus made of the ability
of Approach to communicate effectively with a
heterogeneous target public— the pilots, aircrewmen,
and maintenance personnel of Naval Aviation. Con-
currently, an attempt was made to document the
magazine^ successes, and to illuminate any weak-
nesses with a view toward improving Approach as a
communications medium.
Content analysis of the magazine determined
that it was well designed to carry out the stated

goals of Its publisher—the Safety Center. The
readership survey furnished data demonstrating that
categories of material In Approach are read by the
target public for which they were designed In the
majority of cases. It was thus concluded that Approach
is an effective communications medium.
The study method used discovered certain
unexpected anomalies in the resulting data which
Invite further research. These unexplained phe-
nomena are discussed at length in Chapter 5.
The study method employed proved to be
extremely practical for researchers with limited
resources. Although the resulting measurement of
communication effectiveness is somewhat subjective
in the present case, the flexibility of the method
would permit the attainment of any desired degree
of objectivity and precision by controlling the
validity and reliability of the readership survey.
The public relations significance of this
study lies jointly in two areas. In the practical
realm, the study may be of value to the Naval Aviation
Safety Center in the design of a more effective
medium for use in the communication of aviation safety
material. In the theoretical realm, the study
method utilized herein may be employed to attack

other communications problems involving content
design, media selection, or message content.
In the following pages the design of the
study and the conduct of its various phases are
discussed at greater length.

CHAPTER 2
THE DESIGN OF THE STUDY
This study was conceived as an attempt to
measure the communications effectiveness of Approach
magazine. In order to fulfill this purpose, the answers
to two questions were required. First, is Approach de-
signed to carry out the stated goals of the magazine ed-
itors? Second, does it actually accomplish its stated
and/or its designed purpose among its target publics?
The study was designed to answer these questions
through a three-part analysis v/hich compares: 1) the
stated editorial purpose of the magazine; 2) the evident
purpose determined by internal content analysis; 3) the
actual achievement, based upon a survey of Approach 1 3
readership. A search of the literature revealed no pre-
vious publication of this study method.
Comparison between the stated editorial aims and
the content analysis data affords a measure of design
efficiency. By comparing the actual goals achieved among
its readership with the magazine T s editorial purpose (or
its evident, manifest purpose, if different), a measure
of communication effectiveness results. A third compar-
ison, drawn between the evident purpose based on content

analysis, and the actual achievement may afford a
measurement of validity, as well as affording a basis
for recommendations, if required. Thus the study method
as outlined is applicable, on a larger or smaller scale,
wherever a measurement of communication effectiveness
is desired.
The broad purpose of the study has been outlined.
In order to fulfill this purpose, the questions and hy-
potheses had to be reduced to an operational level for
analysis. As research progressed, a natural trichotomy
evolved which made operationalization readily attainable.
This was the trichotomy furnished by the data required for
comparison.
The first requirement was a measurement of the
editorial purpose, or stated aim, of the magazine. These
data were necessary to afford a comparison with the evident
purpose to be determined by content analysis.
A statement of the editorial aims of Approach was
furnished by the Head of the Safety Education Department,
Naval Aviation Safety Center--the magazine r s publisher.
The goals of Approach are:
1, Publish timely information on accident
prevention developed by NASC analysis.
2, Foster an individual awareness of the im-
portance of naval aircraft incident and accident
prevention.
3, Stimulate application of this awareness
to the program by individual and group foresight,
4, Serve as a medium of exchange of safety
ideas and accident experience among the fleet.
5, ,.,to cover significant and stimulating
general educational information in the fields of

flight operations, aviation medicine (including
safety and survival equipment), and maintenance
and support areas,
In order to make the comparisons required by the
study method, two additional sets of data were required.
It was necessary to determine if the magazine content was
designed to carry out its stated purpose, and to obtain
through a readership survey a measurement of how well it
succeeded in carrying out its evident purpose.
The selection of categories for the content an-
alysis required the guidance of specific hypotheses and
questions. As Milton Stewart has pointea out, validity
in content analysis may suffer from misplaced importance
given to the established categories, 2
The selection of subject matter categories was
facilitated by the content of the magazine, as well as by
the stated aims of the editors. From the author T s ex-
perience in Naval Aviation, an intimate knowledge of the
target publics -was available to aid in category selection,
Final focus was provided for the content analysis and for
the readership study by the following hypotheses to be
Personal letter from CDR. T,A. Williamson, Jr.,
USN, Safety Education Department Head, Naval Aviation
Safety Center, Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia,
March 26, 1963,
* • 2Milton Stewart, "Importance in Content Analysis:




(1) Approach magazine is an effective commun-
ications medium.
(2) Material is read in direct proportion to its
relevance to the individual reader* s job or interest.
(3) Material in Approach is designed to appeal
to a specific target public.
In addition to testing these hypotheses, the
study was structured so as to provide answers to the
following series of questions.
1. What are the types of material presentee as
to subject category?
2. What relationship does each category have to
the total content of the magazine?
3. Do various target publics receive a major
portion of the coverage? If so, which ones and in
what order?
4. What Is the relationship between general
interest material and special interest material?
5. What types of subject matter are afforded
pictoral or graphic coverage?
6. Is space devoted to the relation of hazardous
personal experiences?
7. What is uhe "personality" or general tone
of the magazine?
With the guidance and focus furnished by these
questions, the quantitative content analysis phase of
the study could be undertaken.
Quantitative analysis, however, would not alone
furnish sufficient evidence to determine the apparent
purpose of the magazine. A qualitative analysis of
Approach content was required.
A qualitative content analysis was designed to
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investigate such factors as the "tone" of the material
presented in the various categories and the "personality"
of the magazine. This phase of the content analysis dealt
with the technical level of presentations, the use of
jargon, and the treatment of characters.
The content analysis portion of the study was
designed to provide a complete data-profile of the mag-
azine, its quantitative balance find its qualitative tone
or "personality." This information would define the
apparent purpose--the manifest purpose—and so provide
a basis for comparison with the stated editorial purpose
of Approach as furnished by the publisher.
Effective communication may be defined as that
which has the intended effect upon the target public.
Thus, effective communication requires, not. only that
a target public be reached, but also that the target
public reached must be the one for whom the message was
intended. A measurement of communication effectiveness
therefore required data on the target publics reached by
App poach . For the purposes of this study, if it could be
shown that material designed for a given target public
was read by that target public, the material could be
termed "effective."
In order to _ather these data, a survey of the
magazine's readership was designed.
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For reasons of economy, both of time sua of funds,
as well as to eliminate non-response bias, a survey utilizing
mail questionnaires was not considered appropriate.
Instead, a short, objective questionnaire was chosen.
This could be simply handed to the respondent with a
minimum of explanation. The brevity and objectivity
simplified response coding. As explained in Chapter 4,
respondents were selected on a quota-sample basis, the
limitations inherent in non-probability sampling being
acceptable for the purposes of this study.
The readership survey was designed to provide
data in answer to two specific questions. First, with
what frequency is Approach read by members of the target
public? Second, what categories of material appearing
in the magazine are read by each of :he t^r^t publics?
Armed with these data, comparisons 'night be drawn,
Summa ry
The study vas designed as an attempt to measure
the effectiveness of Approach as a communications tool.
This was to be accomplished through a three-part analysis
which compares: 1) the stated editorial purpose of the
magazine; 2) the evident purpose determined by internal
content analysis; 3) the actual achievement of the mag-
azine as determined by a readership survey,
Comoarison between the stated editorial aims and
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the evident purpose determined by content analysis will
afford a measure of design efficiency. By comparing the
achievement of the magazine among its readership with its
evident purpose, a measure of communication effectiveness
will result. In addition, the final comparison will afford




Dr. Bernard Berelson has defined content analysis
as Ma research technique for the objective, systematic,
and quantitative description of the manifest content of
communication."! Since the purpose of this major portion
of the study was to discover the evident purpose of the
magazine through an examination of its content, an ob-
jective, systematic quantification of the material
appearing in Approach was required. The unit of measure
chosen for the study was the column-inch.
Initial research and experimentation indicated a
requirement for eight categories of classification. The
categories were chosen to accurately describe the material
by subject.
Category one, flight operations , is limited to
material relating to operation of aircraft, procedures,
techniques, and other non-technical articles concerned
with aircraft in flight. This category excludes accounts
of accidents or near-accidents which occurred during flight
In order to facilitate the testing of hypotheses, it was
•Bernard Berelson, Content .Analysis in Commun-
ications Research
.




sub-divided into two parts: carrier cased, and other-than-
carrier based.
Category two, maintenance , Included all features,
notes and articles dealing with the maintenance of air-
craft, the operation of ground support equipment, pre-
ventive maintenance, and foreign object damage control.
It included refueling and maintenance of survival equip-
ment such as ejection- 3eats and oxygen systems.
Category three was labeled aero - medical and
survival . Into this category were placed all articles
dealing with flight physiology, physical fitness, notes
from the flight surgeon, etc. In addition, materials
dealing with the proper use of personal survival equip-
ment plus procedures and techniques for land or water
survival were included if they were not eligible for
category six.
Command and supervision , category four, consists
of material addressed to unit commanding officers, aviation
safety officers, maintenance supervisors and others exer-
cising supervisory responsibility. This category included
the published safety council notes from the various safety
council meetings held throughout the Naval Aviation estab-
lishment.
Category five was labeled technical -aircraft and
equipment
. Material of technical interest relating to
specific equipment, and features of limited application,
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highly technical in nature, were included. An example
of the type material placed into this category is an
article entitled "Ground Cushion." This article deals
with the aerodynamics of lift and the ground effect as
applied to rotary wing aircraft and is written for
helicopter pilots.
Category six was established for hazardous ex -
periences , accidents and Anynouse . Anymouse, a regular
Approach feature, consists of incidents, accidents, or
hazardous experiences of Fleet personnel submitted anony-
mously for publication. Safety Center material relating'
to accual accidents or hazardous experiences was also
included in this category. Hence, first person narrative'
descriptions of survival situations, ditchings or bailouts,
or other emergencies were included.
Professional -other , category seven, was found
necessary to receive material which did not qualify for
categories one through six. This category includes
material on such subjects as instrument flight procedures,
meteorology, air discipline, etc. It is to be emphasized
that material in this category is professional in nature,
designed to be read by one of the target publics (usually
pilots), and is not to be considered miscellaneous. This
category received material which vns excluded from other
J-Major J. A. Gappa, Jr., USA "Ground Cushion,"
Approach
. VIII (Sept. 1962), p. 8-12.
;
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categories by virtu- of the category definitions, but
which deserved classification as professional material.
An eighth category, labjled letters , Keadmouse ,
and ilscellaneous , was • required. Heacmouse, a regular
Approach section, is devoted to ansv/ering questions from
readers.. No attempt was made to classify each letter ac-
cording to category. In addition, t::is cstf-gory received
material which was excluded fror; all others.
In adcitio" to the systematic quantification of
material bj cate^or/, a tabulation of illustrations
(pictures, drawings, cartoons, and graphs) was made.
These data on graphic coverage appear with the category
of material which accompanied them. This aual class-
ification afforded a measure of balance between copy and
graphics in each category.
The use of personal narrative in the relation of
hazardous experiences was tabulated. This afforded an
index of the use of this device in comparison with other
types and categories of presented material.
Twelve • consecutive issues, January, 1962 through
December, 1962, were chosen for the content analysis.
Copies of the magazine were furnished through the courtesy
of the Naval Aviation Safety Center. In the author *s
judgement, these issues are representative of the entire
spectrum of material published by Approach
Material appearing in each Issue was not sampled.
Each article, item, or feature was read in its entirety
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prior to being categorized. Once the decision was made
as to proper category for the material presented, column-
inch measurements were made of both copy and accompanying
graphics and entered in the table. Table 4, contained
in Appendix A, shows the completed content analysis of
each issue by category.
In order to reduce the data which resulted to
a more manageable level, a data-profile was construct-
ed. This data-profile represents an arithmetical average
monthly content of the magazine by category. The results
are shown below in Table 1,
TABLE 1
AVERAGE MONTHLY' CONTENT OF APPROACH
MAGAZINE BY CATEGORY^
Category Copy Graphics Total Percentage
of Issue
Flight Ops.
Carrier 11.25 12.5 23.75 3.5
Other 37.0 23.0 60.0 8.8
Maintenance 95.37 61.12 156.49 22.9
Aero-Medical 82.16 46.66 128.82 18.9
Command & Sup. 25.37 8.4 33.77 5.0
Technical 17.54 7.33 24.87 3.7
Hazardous Exp. 80.41 37.79 118.2 17.3
Professional 36.45 10.45 46.9 6.9
Miscellaneous 65.95 23.25 89.2 13.0
aAll figures except percentages are column-inches
The results of the quantitative content analysis,
shown in Table 1, provide the data required to answer

18
most of the questions raised by the preliminary research.
In the paragraphs below, each question is answered based
upon these data,
1. "hat are the types of material presented as
to subject category? The eight categories established
proved to be entirely adequate for the classification
of all material appearing in Approach magazine. There
appears to be an equitable distribution of material
among the eight categories. As shown in the table, cate-
gory eight ( letters , Headmouse , miscellaneous ) occupies
15% of the magazine. It should be noted, however, that
an average of 64 column-inches per issue is devoted to
Headmouse and letters, both of which are included in
this category. Thus, material given a miscellaneous
classification occupies only 4$ of the magazine space,
2. What relationship does each category have
to the total content of the magazine? Perhaps the most
satisfactory method of answering this question is through
examination of the percentage column of Table 1, The
largest category was maintenance : almost 25% of the con-
tent of the magazine is devoted to it. The smallest
category was technical -aircraft and equipment occupying
3.7$ of the magazine, followed closely by command and
supervision at 5%.
The bulk of the available space, 71.4$ of the
magazine, is devoted to flight operations , aero -medical
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(which includes survival), hazardous experiences , and
maintenance .
3. Do various target publics receive a major
portion of the coverage? If so, which ones and in what
order? As noted earlier, there are three primary target
publics to be considered: pilots, maintenance personnel,
and aircrewmen. In order to postulate an answer to these
questions, it is necessary to assume that pilots are in-
terested in flight operations, maintenance personnel are
interested in maintenance, aircrewraen and pilots are
interested in survival, and so on. In the author's judge-
ment, based upon six years of experience as a Naval Avi-
ator, aircraft commander, and maintenance division officer,
the assumption is valid.
Pilots are therefore a target public for the
material in the flight operations , aero -medical , hazardous
experience , and professional -other categories. Maintenance
personnel are the target public for material in the main-
tenance category. Part of the material in the hazardous
experience category is of interest to maintenance personnel,
Enlisted aircrewmen, the last of the three major target
publics, share interest in the aero -medical and hazardous
experience categories with the pilots, and share the
maintenance category with the maintenance personnel. The




It will be remembered that the maintenance
officers in the Navy are usually pilots; enlisted air-
crewmen are normally drawn from the ranks of maintenance
personnel and perform maintenance duties when not in a
flight status.
The following cautious generalization Is defensible
among target publics, pilots receive the largest percen-
tage of coverage, followed by enlisted aircrewraen and
maintenance personnel, in that order.
4. What is the relationship between general
interest material and special interest material? Special
interest material is arbitrarily defined as that which
is of interest to only one of the target publics* As
can be seen from the foregoing and from Table 1, the
ratio is quite low. In the case of maintenance personnel,
for example, only 21,9% of the magazine (categories one,
four, five, and seven) are of little or no Interest. For
pilots and alrcrewmen, the ratio is even lower. For a
senior aviator filling a maintenance billet and excer-
cising supervisory" authority, the percentage of material
of no interest would approach a theoretical zero.
5. What types of subject matter are given
pictoral or graphic coverage? In the flight operations
and maintenance categories, the ratio of copy to graphics
averaged 3:2. Photographs were used profusely to il-
lustrate the maintenance articles, while drawings and
charts appeared more frequently in the flight operations
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category. A3 noted in Table 1, the technical -a ire raft
and equipment and command and supervision categories
ranked well below the other six in relation of copy
to graphic material presented,
6. Is space afforded to the relation of
hazardous personal experiences? Personal narrative was
found to be a frequently used device. Of all material
—
copy—appearing in the hazardous experience , accidents ,
Anymouse category, 66^ is presented in the form of personal
narrative. The use of dialogue or narrative appeared
infrequently in other categories, although it occasional-
ly was found in the professional -other and aero-medical
categories.
The following examples are offered. They are
typical of the experiences related in narrative form.
The initial acceleration of the cat squashed
me back into the seat. Then I heard a loud crack
unaer my port wing followed by a thump. A pro-
fusion of sparks whipped by the port side of the
cockpit and over the port wing. I was wrenched to
the right and remember looking out over the star-
board catwalk as the plane csreened toward the
starboard side of the flight deck. It felt as
though the plane was skidding sideways down the
deck so I threw full left rudder trying to bring
the nose back forward, all the time maintaining
full power. The nose had almost come back to a
straight forward position as the deck edge lights
whipped out of sight behind me.
• ... I strained my left arm against the
throttle hoping full power might pull me out and I
remember thinking "Hang onl" just before striking
the water in what seemed to be an almost perpen-
dicular attitude.
The initial shock threw me forward against the
shoulder harness and I felt the plane tumbling
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over on top of me as I gulped a mouthful of air.
Almost Immediately, a slapping shock of cold water
crushed me back into the seat. I knew the plane
was uoside down, but could see nothing in the black-
ness.!
The balance of the narrative describes the
pilot f s struggle to clear the aircraft, his mistakes in
the use of his survival equipment, and his prompt rescue
by the crev; of the plane-guard destroyer. Through the
use of personal narrative, the lessons to be learned are
given added impact and credibility.
Source credibility has been found to play an
important role in the initial reception and reaction
given a message by a target audience." The retention
of a given message, depends upon many factors, of which
readibility and interest are two. In the case of many
of the narratives found in Approach , the reader is
interested by virtue of the fact that they represent
situations in v/hich he may someday be placed, and in
which a single mistake could cost him his life. Read-
ing the personal account of one who has survived the
experience allows the reader to benefit vicariously
lwThis Is IU", Approach , VIII (Oct. 1962), p. 27.
2Carl I. Hovland and Walter Weiss, "The
Influence of Source Credibility and Communications
Effectiveness," Public Opinion Quarterly, XV (Winter,
1951), 635-51.
John P. Curry, "Effects of Readibility and
Interest on the Comprehension and Retention of Written




from the knowledge gained. The following example is an
excellent illustration of the employment of this technique,
I was returning to the USS in an F3H-2
from a routine CIC hop. ^he weather was 1000 to
1200 feet broken and the deck was pitching slightly.
The recovery was to be a CCA to a touch-and-go
landing followed by a VFR trap. Upon completion of
the CCA the mirror pass to touchdown was without
incident. The touch-and-go was made and I added
100$ power, retracted the speed brakes, and applied
slight back stick pressure. The aircraft commenced
a normal climb for a few feet followed by a sudden
nose pitch-up. I attempted to nose over and applied
both hands to the stick but could not force it forward
Only blue sky was visible from the cockpit and
from the speed of the oncoming stick-shakes and
stall shudder I would estimate the aircraft to be in
approximately a 50 to 60 degree nose high attitude.
I glanced down at the stick and discovered to my
horror the polaroid lens and radar shield had fallen
off and wedged behind the stick. I reached down
with my right hand in an attempt to dislodge same,
but had no luck due to the reel lock on my seat
being tight and the force with which the polaroid
lens was held in position.
In this fraction of time the aircraft had
become uncontrollable and I was only able to maintain
directional control by applying full rudder opposite
to the direction of yaw. The aircraft yawed first
to the left and I was able to regain directional
control only to be met by a yaw to the right and
again the left each yaw becoming increasingly
violent. I reached for the ejection curtain with
my left hand followed by my right. Apparently
releasing the pressure on the stick allowed the
radar shield to fall sidewise. I kicked at the
shield with my right foot and it turned over. I
returned my right hand to the stick and snapped it
forward and right. At this time the aircraft was
yawing to the right and a wing-over type recovery
was completed at 70 to 100 feet above the water.
A normal arrestment followed and inspection revealed
the radar lens to have one of the locking pins
missing which allowed the polaroid lens and radar
shield to fall and lodge in its peculiar position. *




Needless to say, a prompt remedy was devised to
prevent further occurrences of this near-fatal mishap.
Through publication of this pilot's story, all other
pilots of similar type aircraft could profit from the
experience. Thus forewarned, they might eliminate
this incipient killer from their cockpit. In addition,
maintenance and supervisory personnel would be alerted
to the possible consequences invited by allowing an
aircraft to be flown with even a minor or seemingly
insignificant part missing or inoperative.
Though often repeated in connection with safety
campaigns of many types, the old cliche, "for want of
a nail, a shoe was lost.
. .
.," cannot have the same
impact as the foregoing dramatic story of one man's
brush with death. The use of personal narrative tends
to personalize, and thus fosters an individual awareness
of the importance of accident prevention, one of the
goals of the magazine.
John R. Hoyt, writing on aviation safety almost
twenty years ago, repeatedly stressed the fact that
complacency is perhaps the most persistent and power-
1
ful enemy of safe flight. Complacency may result from
oversight or ignorance; it does not matter. The results
of complacency, regardless of cause, may be equally fatal,
^ohn R. Hoyt, Safety After Solo : How to Fly




The development of military aviation over the
years since Mr. Hoyt wrote his book has been marked by
fantastic advances in the speeds and altitudes of flight,
increased complexity of aircraft, and more and more
demanding missions. These developments have required a
corresponding increase in education and training of
aviation personnel. Still, today, complacency remains
a formidable antagonist. In the words of Jerome Lederer,
the managing director of the Flight Safety Foundation:
Flying is becoming ever more exacting,
requiring strict compliance with proven good
practice, careful attention to detail, continuous
alertness. A pilot must keep abreast of new tech-
niques and new procedures just as the doctor, the
engineer or the lawyer. . . •
In several respects, military and transport
piloting is a more exacting profession than the
others. No other profession is subject to such
frequent proficiency checks. Because of the
precarious nature of his activity and his constant
battle with the law of gravity, the aircraft pilot
must be continually alert to any form of over-
confidence., complacency, egoism, vanity, irrespon-
sibility and impatience.^
One of the primary functions, perhaps the most
important function, of the personal narratives found in
Approach is to aid the professional aviator in combating
these human frailties. By continually exploding the
"it can't happen to me" myth, the narratives of hazard-
ous personal experiences would appear to perform as
valuable psychological weapons in the war against
aviation accidents.
Jerome Lederer, "The Code of the Pilot,"
Approach
. VIII (Nov. 1962), p. 7.
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The development of military aviation over the
years since Mr. Hoyt wrote his book has been marked by .
fantastic advances in the speeds and altitudes of flight,
increased complexity of aircraft, and more and more
demanding missions. These developments have required a
corresponding increase in education and training of
aviation personnel. Still, today, complacency remains
a formidable antagonist. In the words of Jerome Lederer,
the managing director of the Flight Safety Foundation:
Flying is becoming ever more exacting,
requiring strict compliance with proven good
practice, careful attention to detail, continuous
alertness. A pilot must keep abreast of new tech-
niques and new procedures just as the doctor, the
engineer or the lawyer. ...
In several respects, military and transport
piloting is a more exacting profession than the
others. No other profession is subject to such
frequent proficiency checks. Because of the
precarious nature of his activity and his constant
battle with the law of gravity, the aircraft pilot
must be continually alert to any form of over-
confidence., complacency, egoism, vanity, irrespon-
sibility and impatience.
1
One of the primary functions, perhaps the most
important function, of the personal narratives found in
Approach is to aid the professional aviator in combating
these human frailties. By continually exploding the
"it can't happen to me" myth, the narratives of hazard-
ous personal experiences would appear to perform as
valuable psychological weapons in the war against
aviation accidents.
ijerorae Lederer, "The Code of the Pilot,"
Approach . VIII (Nov. 1962), p. 7.
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The narratives perform an additional important
function. Attention may be called to inadequate survival
equipment, a requirement for modification of existing
procedures, or a need for additional training of per-
sonnel. These functions are served, if, as the result
of a published narrative, one aviation safety officer
in a squadron deployed on the other side of the globe
recognizes a similar set of circumstances in his squadron
and takes steps to correct them. This is accident pre-
vention at work, ra?de possible through a communications
medium.
7. What is the "personality" or general tone
of the magazine? Approach is highly informal, interest-
ing and informative. It commonly treats highly technical
or complex subjects in a simple yet thorough manner.
The writing style is colorful and designed for rapid
comprehension.
The frequent use of illustrations permits the
reader to browse at his peril; the artowrk and layout
are skilfully designed to arrest one's attention.
Highly technical articles are few. Those that are
presented include numerous charts, graphs, and tables
to aid the reader.
Approach is printed on glossy paper in clean,
easy-to-read type. Each issue averages 48 pages in
length. Each is self contained: no articles or features
are continued from one issue to the next. There are
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regular departments and features which appear in each
issue, such as Anyraouse, Notes from the Flight Surgeon,
and Maintenance Notes and Comments,
^he use of jargon in Approach is restricted to
the language peculiar to Naval Aviation, and common to
those in the profession. In the technical category,
the language is determined by the content of the
material. Engineering terras, when used, are fully
explained in the text #
Notable is the magazine's flair for humorous
treatment of a complex idea. Although sofety is serious
business, humor has its place. The proud, the pompous,
or the complacent may be partially deflsted by the
prick of a sharpened wit. The ability to laugh at
one's self in an embarrassing situation, the ability
to swallow one's pride end admit that help is needed,
are healthy attributes of the professional aviator.
Frequently, in an Approach article, there is humor;
often one finds gentle satire. In the issues analyzed,
however, the theme or lessons of the articles were
never unduly submerged or camouflaged, as the following
example will illustrate.
As you probably know, electrons are tiny lit-
tle electric corpuscles that ricochet eround
through wires and condensers ^nd thingamabobs,
moving sundry pointers and dials into positions
which, when correctly interpreted, present useful
information to a pilot. Said pilot can then super-
impose said useful information onto shifty little
charts which will in turn enable him to remain on
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a chosen route most of the time. However, some-
times hungry little cosmic bacteria get in the
thingamabobs and gobble up the electronic corpuscles,
so the information presented is either feverish or
nil. Pilots who are not somewhat prepared for this
horrible eventuality may experience coronary nausea,
or heart-In-throat trouble.
^
Readability, as defined by Professor Albert J.
Sullivan of Boston University, is that quality which
helps the reader get the message quickly. The compo-
nents which make copy readatle are: short sentences,
an average of fifteen words each; conversational
language, a level of 75$ one-syllable words; personal-
ity, ten nersonal references per one hundred words;
and mechanical means such as subheads, paragraphing,
line spacing, etc. 2
Using these criteria for evaluation, a total
of sixteen samples (two one -hundred word samples from
each category) were analyzed for readability. The
most readable, as might be expected, was the material
in the hazardous experience category, which contains
personal narratives. The technical and command and
supervision categories were found to be the most dif-
ficult. The samples chosen showed an average sentence
length of twenty-one words and a language level of 59$
one-syllable words in the latter categories.
XLT Benjamin 0. Bibb, USN, "The Great Gray Area,"
Approach
. VIII (Aug. 1962), p. 7.
2Albert J. Sullivan, "Seminar in Effective
Writing," Boston University, 1965. Notes in mimeo-
graphed form.

An overall evaluation of the readability of
Approach would place it close to the "ideal" given
above. The average sentence length of eighteen words
is partially offset by the "personality" of the
magazine--an average of fourteen personal references
per one hundred words. The average language level for
all categories combined was 68$ one-syllable words.
Mechanical means are used to good advantage in all
categories of material. Hence, it may be concluded
that Approach magazine is designed to be readable--
to enable the reader to grasp its message quickly.
Summary
The content analysis portion of the study was
undertaken to determine the evident purpose of the
magazine. This would include the types of material
presented, the relative balance between the categories,
the target publics toward which the material is direct-
ed, and the tone of "personality" of the material
presented.
Material appearing in Approach was found to be
distributed rather unevenly among the eight categories
chosen for classification. In percentages, this spread
ranged from a high of twenty-three for the maintenance
category to a low of almost four for the technical cat-
egory. The majority of content (71.4$) was devoted to
four categories: flight operations , aero-medical , main -




Three target publics are evident from the
material presented. Although no distinct separation
is possible, the publics may be validly labelled
pilots, aircrewraen, and maintenance personnel. An
important sub-public could be termed supervisory
personnel. This would include unit commanders and
aviation safety officers, as well as maintenance
supervisory personnel.
Material presented in Approach is designed to
be informative and interesting. The majority of copy
is highly readable, due both to its significance and
to the manner in which it is presented. The style of
writing found prevalent is marked by its color, clarity
and crispness.
The magazine appears highly informal in tone.
Humor and personal narrative are used liberally through-
out the copy. Illustrations are numerous and appear to
be designed to arrest one's attention and invite perusal
of the accompanying material.
Much of the material presented is timely and
appears designed to stimulate thought or discussion on
the subject involved. The hazardous personal experiences,
retold in narrative form, allow the reader to share and
profit from the writer's experience. An analysis of
mistakes made in a given situation aids in creating an
awareness of the need for adequate training in, and
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practice of, correct emergency procedures. The use
of personal narrative would appear as an attempt to




Effective communication has been defined as
that which has the intended effect upon the target
public. Therefore, to be effective, the message
must reach the target public for which it was Intend-
ed.
In order to attempt a measurement of the
effectiveness of Approach magazine as a communications
medium, data on the target publics reached was required.
A survey of Approach readership was undertaken to gather
these data.
From both quantitative and qualitative analysis
of the magazine content, it was apparent that there
exist three target publics for which material is writ-
ten: pilots, aircrewmen, and maintenance personnel.
Thus it was necessary, for purposes of comparison and
evaluation, to obtain data from these tprget publics
concerning the categories of material in Approach which
were read.
Since the magazine Is distributed worldwide,
to Fleet aviation units everywhere, a representative




a mail questionnaire was also considered inappropriate,
due to the non-response bias generated. It was decided
that, for the purpose of this study, no fatal error
would be introduced by selecting a non-probability
sample, A quota sample method was chosen as being
adequate for the purpose of the study, economical in
both time and funds, and convenient for the investi-
gator.
Quota sampling may be defined as a type of non-
probability sample designed n . . .to guarantee the
inclusion in the sample of diverse elements of the
population and to make sure that these diverse elements
are taken account of in the proportions in which they
occur in the population."^ Since the findings of the
survey were to be reported separately for each of the
target publics (population strata), the proportional
representation factor was not significant. It was






quirement In quota sampling is not that the various
population strata be sampled in their correct pro-
portions, but rather that there be enough cases from
each stratum to make possible an estimate of the
KJlaire Selltiz and Others, Research Methods
in Social Relations . (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, Inc., 1962), p. 516.
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population stratum value, • . . nl
The questionnaire was designed to be simply
handed to the respondent with a minimum of explanation.
In addition, the questionnaire was designed to be
objective, impersonal, and anonymous. These advantages
were judged to outweigh any disadvantages of obtaining
P
the required data by this method.
The questionnaire used was designed to provide
answers to the two specific questions raised earlier:
1, With what frequency is Approach read by
members of the target publics?
2. What categories of material appearing in
Approach are read by each of the target publics?
From preliminary research, which included a
small pilot survey, came the knowledge of the existence
of the three distinct target publics: pilots, aircrewmen,
and maintenance personnel. Although some individuals
may properly belong to more than one of the target
publics, (for example: a pilot serving as a maintenance
officer), it was determined that this classification,
or categorization, of target publics was valid for the
purposes of the survey.
In the construction of the questionnaire some




jFor a thorough discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of questionnaires, see Selltiz, 238-40.
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analysis were omitted. The categories chosen for
inclusion were those which constituted a majority of
the magazine content and included the material directed
toward each of the three target publics.
The categories included were: flight operations ;
maintenance ; aero -medical and survival ; hazardous ex-
perience , Anymouse , accidents ; and Headmouse , letters
and miscellaneous . Combined, these five categories
comprise 84.4^ of the total average monthly content
of Approach magazine.
From preliminary research results—the results
of the pilot study--it was hypothesized that:
1. Material is read in direct proportion to
its relevance to the individual reader's job or interest
2. Material in Approach is designed to appeal
to a specific target audience or public.
The results of the content analysis, discussed
in Chapter 3, strongly supported the second hypothesis.
In order to test the first hypothesis, the survey would
have to produce data indicating the relative frequencies
with which the various categories of material were read
by the various target publics. If it could be demon-
strated that members of the target publics involved
actually read the material designed for them, that mat-
erial then might be termed "effective."
The survey, as designed, had two limitations

36
which qualify the resulting data. First, since a non-
probability sample was used, the sample of the target
publics drawn may not be truly representative of the
population.
The second limitation is one of validity. Due
to the nature of the questions asked— the inherent
difficulty of checking responses without administering
a lengthy questionnaire containing cross-check iteras--
validity might suffer. The validity also is dependent
on a common understanding of the word "read" as used
in the questionnaire. This semantic obstacle was
accepted. The questions used were worded to impart the
standard definition from context,
- The decision to omit questions dealing with
the aims of the editors was reached as an effort to
avoid the halo effect where possible. To the question,
"Are you aware of the importance of aircraft accident
prevention?" the only possible answer is, "Yes I" Thus
the survey is predicated on the assumption that if the
material is read by the target public for which it
is designed, the aims "to foster an awareness, • ,,"
and to "stimulate application, . ," are attainable.
An additional factor considered was that of the
"proper answer." Approach is the official publication
of the Naval Aviation Safety Center. Although the
masthead includes the notation that, "contents should
not be construed as regulations, orders, or directives,"
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the magazine Is one of the more authoritative voices- in
the field of aviation safety. The masthead also pro-
claims that the magazine, rt . • .presents the most ac-
curate information currently available on the subject
of aviation accident prevention." Familiarity with the
inagazine , s content could be termed "expected conduct"
of the professional personnel within Naval Aviation.
It could thus be argued that members of the various
target publics might feel th?t they should read
Approach , whether or not they do so, and answer the
questionnaire accordingly. It is hoped that the anony-
m i ty, objectivity, and brevity of the questionnaire
compensated in part for this human tendency.
The author is deeply indebted to the Naval
Aviation Safety Center, and to its Safety Education
Department Head, CDR T.A. Williamson, Jr., USN, whose
assistance was instrumental in making possible the
conduct of a much larger survey than was originally
planned.
The questionnaire was designed to provide the
required data upon receiving answers to three objective
questions from each respondent.
The questions used were:
1. Do you read Approach regularly seldom
never ?
2. What do you usually read in Approach?
Flight operations material Anymouse, accident;




3, What Is your primary duty? (pilot, aircrew,
shop, line)
With the assistance of the Safety Center, a
total sample of 550 respondents was obtained. This
sample includes representatives from all phases of
Naval Aviation: multi-engine patrol and anti-submarine,
carrier-based fighter and attack, rotary wing (heli-
copter) anti-submarine, and the Naval Air Training
Command. The squadrons and Air Stations sampled
ranged from Brunswick, Maine to Sanford, Florida and
west to North Island (San Diego), California.
A breakdown of the sample into target publics
shows 189 pilots, 95 aircrewraen, and 262 maintenance
personnel. The sample included both regular and
reserve personnel.
Table 2, shown below, compares the data received
in answer to questions one and three--reader class-
ification and primary duty. The answers received to
question three were used to classify the respondent as
to target public.
It will be noted that the table does not include
any respondents who indicated that they never read
Approach , even though this response was provided for
in the questionnaire.
The provision of a category for a response
not expected to occur is rooted in the principle
"•
• .that ideas for categorization should always

















the evidence in hand and general knowledge and anticipa-
tory analysis of the possible types of response, based
on theoretical, logical, or practical considerations.
The application of this rule for the establishment of
categories leads to the possible discovery of the sig-
nificant absence of some response, which might other-
wise have gone unnoticed. "^
Although not absent, in the case of the "read
Approach nevern category, the data is felt to be sig-
nificant. Less than one per cent—a total of four
respondents--fell into this category. These four
questionnaires were of no further value to the purpose




546 respondents supplying the data for Tables 2 and
3.
In constructing Table 3, the data provided by
question two was used. Two groups of percentages are
presented—one for each group of readers, "regular"
and "seldom," The regular readers outnumber those who
seldom read Approach by a ratio of approximately 4:1.
The reader will note that a given respondent may in-
dicate that he reads one or more categories of material,
In this case he would be tabulated in each category
indicated. For example, of the 185 pilots who read
Approach regularly, 178 or 96.2$ indicated that they
read material in the flight operations category; 122
or 65.9$ marked the maintenance category, and so on.
The results of the survey of Approach reader-
ship produced the data required for the testing of the
hypotheses formulated. In addition, certain of the
findings suggested frutiful avenues for further re-
search. These implications will be discussed in a
later chapter.
One of the more significant--and interesting
—
facts brought to light by the survey was the large
percentage of the total sample, 82$, which fell into
the "regular reader" category. This fact is seen as
an expression of a general attitude toward the mag-
azine, by personnel associated with Naval Aviation.
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38.8 65.2 36.1 77.7 65.2
aNot considered valid,
subscriptions to Approach . Instead, copies are
distributed to all Naval Aviation activities at the
rate of one copy for each ten persons assigned. The
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initiative for obtaining the monthly copy of the mag-
azine thus rests with the individual; he remains a
would-be-reader until his quest is successful. The
fact that 447 out of 550 respondents managed to be
successful would indicate that Approach is regarded
as desirable reading, and so generates the persistent
individual effort required to obtain copies.
The survey results indicated that the anti-
cipated relationship between target publics and
categories of material read did, in fact, exist. The
data showed that 96.2$ of the pilots (regular readers)
read material in the flight operations category; 85.7$
of the maintenance personnel read material in the
maintenance category. Conversely, only 60.0/S of the
maintenance personnel read material in the fliftht
operations category, while only 65.9$ of the pilots
read material in the maintenance category.
Worthy of special note was the interest
expressed in category six
—
Anymouse , accidents , haz -
ardous experiences . As expressed by Table 3, all
target publics showed a high degree of reader interest
in this category. By target publics, 94.0$ of the
pilots, 81.9$ of the aircrewmen, and 82.6$ of the
maintenance personnel who regularly read Approach
,
read the material in this category. A rather inter-
esting anomaly occurred in the figures for those who
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read Approach seldom: a significantly higher per-
centage (77.7$) of the maintenance personnel read
this category than read the maintenance category
(65.2#).
Another unexpected figure occurred for the
aircrewmen. . It wss anticipated that, since the air-
crewmen are normally maintenance personnel when on the
ground, they would be most interested in material
appearing in the maintenance category with a secondary
interest in category one, flight operations , shared
with pilots. Such was not the case, Aircrewmen who
read the magazine regularly shaved the reverse relation*
ship: 72.2$ read flight operations material, while
68,1$ read the material in the maintenance category.
Of the aircrewmen who read Approach seldom, 65.2$
read maintenance , while only 38.8$ read flight
operations . These latter data tend to support the
expected relationship but must yield to the much
larger sample obtained of the regular readers.
Another anticipated relationship is
illustrated by the data obtained for category three,
aero -medical (which included flight physiology and
the use of survival equipment). This category is
most relevant to pilots and is of least interest
to maintenance personnel. The ambivalent air-
crewmen were expected to fall between. They did:
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the percentages show thst 80.0$ of the pilots,
73.6$ of the aircrewraen', and 54.2$ of the main-
tenance personnel regularly read category three.
Summa ry
The readership survey was undertaken to
gather data on the reading behavior of Approach
magazine f s target publics. These data were necessary
to afford a basis for the testing of hypotheses
formulated and to enable the comparison of the
designed purpose of the magazine with its achieved
purpose.
A non-probability sample (quota sample)
was drawn to represent the population of Naval
Aviation personnel. The limitations inherent in
this type sampling were accepted.
A brief questionnaire was utilized which
would provide data concerning the respondent's
classification as to target public, the frequency
with which he read the magazine, and the categories
of material that were read.
A total of 550 questionnaires were received,
of which 546 furnished usable data. These data are
tabulated in Tables 2 and 3.
The readership survey provided the third
and final group of data required to fulfill the
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purpose of the study--an attempted measurement of
the communication effectiveness of Approach magazine*
by supplying data on how well the magazine succeeded
in carrying out its evident purpose.

CHAPTER 5
DATA ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Approach magazine is the communications
tool through which the Naval Aviation Safety Center
carries on its crusade against aircraft accidents.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, this
mission is vital to the national security—its accomp-
lishment is measured in the saving of trained lives.
Although modern aircraft weapon-systems are expensive,
they may be replaced. Lives may not be.
This study was conceived as an attempt to
measure the effectiveness of Approach as a communi-
cations tool, and to document, or attempt to analyze,
some of the characteristics which make the magazine
successful or unsuccessful.
Many insights into the characteristics of
the magazine were provided by the content analysis.
Some of these were discussed in Chapter 3. Further
insight may be furnished by testing one of the three
guiding hypotheses: material in Approach is designed
to appeal to a specific target audience.
This hypothesis is strongly supported by the




category of material, maintenance , occupies 22.9$ of
the average monthly content of the magazine. It is
written for, and designed to be read by, maintenance
personnel of all ranks and ratings. Material was
found to cover the entire spectrum of maintenance
responsibility—from nhow-to-do-it n articles for the
mechanic, to the administration of a quality control
system for an entire squadron. Most articles were
timely, practical, and of immediate value and ap-
plication to some major segment of the aircraft main-
tenance program. Frequently, an article was slanted
--stressing proper maintenance—toward the prevention
of some known factor or procedure which had been
indicted as the contributory cause of an accident
or mishap.
The flight operations , aero-medical , and
hazardous experience categories were designed to be
read by pilots and aircrewmen. This was apparent from
the use of jargon, the topics presented, and the manner
of presentation. Combined, these three categories
account for 48.5$ of the average monthly content of
the magazine.
Material presented in the flight operations
category is usually applicable to a wide range of air-
craft types, even though it may be written about a
specific one. For example, an article concerning night
formation flying, its peculiar hazards and techniques,
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might be written from the standpoint of an attack
bomber pilot. The same problems however, occur in
any type aircraft which may fly night formation
missions; hence the information presented is valuable
to all pilots.
An interesting—and unexplained—relationship
was discovered to exist concerning the flight operations
category and the reading behavior of the aircrewmen.
It will be recalled that 72.2$ of those reading Ap -
proach regularly, and 60.8$ of those reading Approach
seldom, read the material in this category. The cate-
gory assumed to be of primary interest, maintenance ,
did not fare so well in comparison. The percentages
showed 68.1 and 65.2 for the respective readership
classifications. One might speculate that the aircrew-
men tend to identify with pilots, and so read the
flight operations material. Another motive might be
escapism.
Further investigation of this phenonenon is,
in the writer 1 3 opinion, warranted. Since all enlisted
aircrewraen are volunteers in Naval Aviation, information
concerning their motivation to fly, and their attitudes
toward aircrew duties, would be of great value in the
selection and training of aircrew candidates. A
study of this nature, based upon motivational research,
would aid in explaining the readership behavior of the
aircrewmen as a target public.
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The data produced by the aero -medical and
and hazardous experience categories lends further
support to the hypothesis. Since the aero -medical
category Is of primary Interest to pilots, secondary
interest to aircrewraen, 8nd tertiarily, to maintenance
personnel, it was anticipated that the readership
survey would add support to the hypothesis. It did.
The readership percentages for the three target
publics, in order, were 80.0, 73.6, and 54.2.
The material appearing In the hazardous
experience category appeared to be written primarily
for those who fly. Lessons In emergency procedures,
the proper use of survival equipment, ditching or
bailout techniques, and similar subjects constitute
a major portion of the material appearing in this
category. Frequently, the article or narrative Involves
a dramatic tale of survival—man against the unknown,
the unexpected. The lessons to be learned from these
experiences are of benefit to anyone who could be
placed in similar circumstances. It was thus expected
that pilots should reflect the highest percentage of
readership of this category. This was proven to be
true. The percentages for the target publics were
pilots, 94.0; aircrewraen, 81.9; and the maintenance
personnel, 82.6. These percentages are for the
regular readers only. Missing data for the pilots
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In the "seldom" classification does not permit valid
comparison.
Material in the hazardous experience
category does not omit maintenance personnel, how-
ever. A significant number of articles or narratives
placed into this category dealt with incidents occurring
on the ground. One such example might be an article
illustrating the unhappy consequesces of improper
refueling procedures--the substitution of 115/145
Avgas (high octane aviation gasoline) for jet fuel
In the tanks of a jet fighter. Caught on the ground
by an alert plane captain, such a mishap would merely
be embarrassing. If discovered after take-off by a
pilot, certain damage would result to the jet engine
—
if not loss of the aircraft, or of the pilot f s life.
Articles designed for maintenance personnel
in the hazardous experience category frequently stres-
sed the role played by the individual skill, initiative,
and competence of the person performing a seemingly
insignificant task. Such roles are Just as important
to the accomplishment of the aircraft's mission as
any other: this fact is repeatedly emphasized.
Content analysis revealed that 66$ of all
material in the hazardous experience category was
presented in the form of personal narrative. There
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are several reasons apparent for this style, or
method, of presentation. Two are, perhaps, obvious.
First Is the personality added to the material
through the use of this device. This furnishes the
reader an opportunity to participate vicariously in
the experience being described. He may share the
fortunes--and misfortunes--of the narrator, and thus
profit from the knowledge gained. The second factor
is reader interest. Interest is gained by providing
information in a form familiar to all readers--the
w sea story." One can almost imagine the pilot,
standing wet and disheveled on the flight deck
after his rescue, saying, ". • .and there I was. • •
upside down, when. • . •"
There are other important factors gained
which are not so obvious to the layman. These merit
discussion.
In an article entitled "Psychological
Barriers to Communication," Dr. Daniel Katz listed
four specific obstacles to communication: "(1) the
failure to refer language to experience and reality,
(2) the inability to transcend personal experience
in intergroup communication, (3) stereotypes: the
assimilation of material to familiar frames of
reference, and (4) the confusion of percept and
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and concept: reification and personification."1
The use of personal narrative in the relation of
hazardous experiences would appear to materially
reduce the effectiveness of the first two barriers
listed. The words of one who has undergone such
an experience certainly relate to reality--a reality
with which many in the target audience will be
familiar. Although perhaps deprived of the same
personal experience, the reader may internalize the
information by sharing the experience vicariously.
Thus it would become a substitute for personal
experience, bypassing the third obstacle mentioned.
As noted earlier, source credibility plays
an important part in the initial reception and reaction
given a message by a target audience. One of the
factors mentioned in connection with credibility is
o
expertise. One who has survived to relate his ex-
periences is apt to be granted the status of "expert"
concerning that particular incident. His narrative
will have more influence than an objective report of
the incident by an outside observer.
Daniel Katz, "Psychological Barriers to
Communication," in Wilbur Schramm, Mass Communications
.
(Urbana, 111., University of Illinois Press, 1960),
p. 318.





To the communicator, ".
.
.influence is cur-
rency," according to Dr. Otto Lerbinger. It must be
spent wisely and well. Varied events, retold through
the medium of narrative, would tend to exert influence
on those who read thera. Although the influence could
be negative, as in the case of a reader who vowed
never to fly after reading of a particularly harrowing
experience, the narratives in Approach exert a salutary
influence on the professional aviator or aircrewman.
In the author's opinion, the narratives would tend to
jolt the complacent, reassure the professional, and
motivate the neophyte to become proficient in emergency
procedures and the use of survival equipment.
Although personal influence has many liraita-
o
tions, the added prestige and authority of the magazine
itself would aid in the fulfillment of these goals.
Since the hazardous experience category is the most
widely read single category of Approach content, it
can be argued that its influence is present among all
target publics. Precisely what the influence is would
require more data than the present study collected.
Again, further research should prove fruitful.
Otto Lerbinger, "Public Relations: Principles
and Practice," Lecture notes, Boston University, 1963.
P
For a discussion of these limitations, see
Stanley K. Bigraan, "Prescige, Personal Influence, and
Opinion," in Wilbur Schramm, The Process and Effects
of Mass Communications
,
(CJrbana, 111., The University
o? TITTnois Press, 1961), 403-410.
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A second hypothesis was also accepted. This
stated that: material is read in direct proportion to
its relevance to the individual reader's job or interest,
Although one might be tempted to accept the hypothesis
as valid a priori, the purpose of this study demanded
that documentation be provided.
In order to test the hypothesis, a standard
statistical test of significance (chi-square) was
applied to certain of the data resulting from the
readership study. A level of confidence of .05 was
adjudged acceptable. In order that comparisons of
target publics • might be made, only two were included
in each test.
The first comparison made was between the
aircrewraen and maintenance personnel and their reader-
ship behavior toward the aero -medical and maintenance
categories. This produced significance at the .05
level, and nearly reached the .01 level of confidence.
The interesting phenomenon, previously dis-
cussed, which resulted from the data on the readership
of flight operations material by the aircrewraen was
also tested. These data were compared with the same
public's behavior toward the maintenance category,
and with the pilot's readership of the same categories.
The resulting chi-square did not reach significance,
although the margin was smaller than expected.
The actual chi-square required for acceptance
at the .05 level was 3.84: 3.78 was achieved.
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Several factors which may impinge upon this relation-
ship were discussed above.
It has been stated, (only partially tongue-
in-cheek), that, "Prominent among the arts of persuasion
is the comparison of incomparables." Most of the facts
developed above will stand alone. One of them indi-
cates a weakness in Approaches ability to accomplish
its mission when compared with the overall readership
behavior of the target public involved. Perhaps the
reader v/ill forgive an attempt to elaborate at the
risk of comparing the incomparable.
Proper maintenance of aircraft is a complex
and demanding task which requires the utmost in pro-
fessional skill from those participating in the program.
The maintenance program demands the enthusiastic co-
operation of all. concerned. These alone, however, will
not insure success. A vital ingredient in the success
of the maintenance effort is the knowledge of main-
tenance procedures, practices, and problems held by
the pilots in the squadron.
If this knowledge is incomplete, the result
is a formidable addition to the workload placed upon
the personnel in the maintenance department. This
may mean that many hours are spent "trouble-shooting"
an elusive discrepancy—hours that would have been
Raymond Moley, "Fishy Statesmanship,"
Newsweek
. (June 24, 1963), p. 120.
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saved had the pilot been able to enter a precise,
accurate, and complete discrepancy baaed upon an inti-
mate and thorough knowledge of all phases of the prob-
lem. It is also possible that, through ignorance or
oversight, the poorly informed pilot fails to record
a discrepancy, thus setting up a chain of events which
may end in disaster.
Constant effort is exerted to prevent such
events. Information is presented to pilots through
lectures, handbooks, instructions, notices, etc.
An additional source of timely information is the
maintenance category of Approach content. The fact
that pilots, as a target public, do not read this
material as often as they might is evident from i:he
readership survey. The readership figure for the.
maintenance category was 65.9$, the lowest of the
eight categories tested for this target public.
This figure does not serve as an indictment
of pilots. On the contrary, it serves to reinforce
the evidence in favor of the first hypothesis tested:
material in Approach is designed to appeal to a specific
target audience.
In the writer's judgement, a re-evaluation
of the design standard for material in the maintenance
category is indicated. While it would be equally
undesirable to design the material in this category
for pilots alone , a re-evaluation might indicate a
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basis for a fusion, or convergence, of reader interest
in many cases. The problem exists. Further attention
is invited.
The third and final hypothesis to be tested
—
the actual ralson d f etre of the entire study--stated
that: Approach magazine is an effective safety commun-
ications medium. Since this hypothesis does not lend
itself to statistical tests of significance with the
data gathered, a method of offering proof through
comparison was designed. An effective instrument of
communication, as defined operationally for this study,
was one which was designed to fulfill its stated goals,
and actually accomplished its stated and/or designed
purpose among its readership.
Thus, a measurement of the effectiveness of
Approach magazine may be made by comparing: 1) the
stated editorial purpose of the magazine; 2) the
evident or manifest purpose determined by content
analysis; and 3) the actual achievement, based upon a
readership survey.
In general, the magazine is well designed to
carry out the stated goals of the editors. In support
of this conclusion, the following paragraphs offer
arguments based upon the content analysis data.
The first goal stated was: "Publish timely
information on accident prevention developed by NASC
analysis." Although not confined to any single category,
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material in support of this goal constituted a major
portion of the hazardous experience category. Fre-
quently, an article classified as maintenance or pro -
fessional-other contained such information, as did
material in the aero -medical category.-
A second goal, to "Foster an individual
awareness of the importance of naval aircraft incident
and accident prevention," must be supported on the basis
of the assumption that man is rational. Material is
published, notably in the maintenance and hazardous
experience categories, which is designed to influence
the individual toward this end. The role of the in-
dividual, and his relationship to the team, was the
subject or theme of several articles noted. These
would tend to support the goal and aid in its accomp-
lishment.
In order to "stimulate application of this
awareness to the program by individual and group fore-
sight," the third goal, Approach content is designed
to place constant stress on the responsibility of the
individual, both to the group and to the mission. An
example would be an article in the flight operations
category which stressed the responsibility of the
formation leader who must plan for all actions of his
wingmen as well as his own. 1 The success of the entire
mission depends upon his judgement and foresight; the
mission is not completed until he and his formation
Major C.H. Coppedge, USMC, "Let Me Lead,"
Approach
. VII, (May, 1962), 1-3.
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have returned to base, safely.
Rear Admiral W.O. Burch, Jr., when Commander
of the Naval Aviation Safety Center, was quoted as
saying, "We must be ever mindful of the mistakes in
»1
aviation history or we are condemned to repeat them."
In an effort to create the state of mind which might be
termed "safety-conciousness, " Approach magazine pre-
sents material to all three of its target publics
which is designed to acquaint them with these mistakes.
The accident analyses, listing contributory causes,
are designed to create an awareness of these causes
within the reader. The mistakes made in the use of
survival equipment are pointed out in the course of
the narratives appearing in the hazardous experience
category. Poor maintenance practices are singled out
in the glare of publicity. All are designed to empha-
size that safety requires continuous effort on the part
of all aviation personnel.
The fourth goal, "Serve as a medium of
exchange of safety ideas and accident experience
among the fleet," is more easily attained than the
others. Approach provides continuous coverage of
accident experience through its hazardous experience
and aero -medical categories of material. As noted
1Approach . VII, (April, 1962), p. 50.
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previously, an average of 64 column-inches per issue
is devoted to letters from its readers. These fre-
quently involve suggestions, or ideas, contributed in
attempt to improve a solution to a safety problem.
The forum thu3 provided serves all elements of the
target public as a medium of exchange of safety ideas*
The final goal of Approach was "to cover
significant and stimulating general educational in-
formation in the fields of flight operations, aviation
medicine (including safety and survival equipment),
and maintenance and support areas." It was apparent
that Approach content was designed to fulfill this
purpose. All areas mentioned were amply covered.
The categories aero -medical , ma intenance , and flight
operations combined, constitute 54.1$ of the average
monthly content. The material is timely, interesting,
and informative.
In summary, there appears to be a very close
design tolerance between the stated purpose of Approach
,
as given by the editors, and the evident purpose as
determined by content analysis, both quantitative and
qualitative. The magazine is designed to carry out its
stated purpose in all major dimensions.
In order to achieve this purpose among its
target publics—before the magazine can become an ef-
fective tool of coramunications--the material it con-
tains must be read by the target public for which it
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was designed, A measurement of Approach 1 s effective-
ness will thus result from a comparison of the content
analysis data, which shows what categories of material
are designed to be read by which target public, and
the readership study data showing who doe3 read the
material.
The final hypothesis to be tested stated that
Approach is an effective communications medium. In
view of the operational definitions employed, this
hypothesis can be proven by demonstrating that the
target publics read the material designed for them.
The four categories to be examined in test-
ing this hypothesis are: flight operations , maintenance ,
aero-medical , and hazardous experience .
The flight operations category is designed
to be read by pilots. This was demonstrated by the
type of subject matter presented, the use of jargon
peculiar to pilots, and the technical level of pre-
sentations, as determined by qualitative content
analysis. Quantitatively, the category occupies 12.3^
of the magazine space.
In order to be effective, this material would
have to be read by the target public for which it is
designed--pilots. The readership data showed that
96.2$ of the 185 pilots regularly reading Approach
do read this material. Hence, it may be concluded that




The content analysis indicated that the
material in the maintenance category was designed
primarily for maintenance personnel. Again, the
technical level of presentations and the topics
presented provide the evidence. In some cases,
maintenance articles were directed tow c rd pilots.
These were in the minority. The maintenance person-
nel surveyed showed relatively high readership of
this category. The percentage of regular Approach
readers who marked this cat^go'-y was 85.7$. Of those
who read seldom, only 47 out of 72 (or 65.2$) read
the maintenance category.
The aircrewmen, who share an occupational
interest in the maintenance category, were found to
read this category less frequently. The percentages
were: regular readers, 68.1: "seldom" readers, 65.2.
The lowest readership of the maintenance
category was found to exist among pilots. Of the 185
regular Approach readers, only 122 (or 65.9$) read
the material in this category.
The aero-medical category occupies 18.9$ of
the magazine °nd is directed toward two target publics-
pilots and aircrewmen. The material presented, which
includes flight physiology and the use of survival
equipment, is of minor interest to maintenance
personnel. It is of vital importance to those who fly,
Among the regular readers in these target publics,
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the data showed that 80.0$ of the pilots and 73.6$
of the aircrewmen read the aero -medical material.
The fourth category examined, hazardous
experience , comprises 17.3$ of the average monthly-
content of Approach . The majority of material In
this category is directed toward pilots. Much of
this material, even though pilot-oriented, is
applicable to alrcrewraen. Both publics would be
interested in a tale of a successful night ditching
and rescue, for example, with an analysis of the
mistakes made. Of the regular readers, 94.0$ of
the pilots and 81.9$ of the alrcrewmen read the
material in this category.
Maintenance personnel are a target public
for a portion of the material In the hazardous exper-
ience category* As noted previously, articles dealing
with faulty maintenance practices which contributed
to an accident or near-accident occasionally appear
In this category. According to the readership data,
82.6$ of the maintenance personnel who regularly reed
Approach , and 77.7$ of those who read it "seldom,"
read the material in this category.
The decision to accept the final hypothesis--
that Approach magazine is an effective communications
medium—Is based upon the demonstrated relationship
between the designed purpose of the material presented
and the reading behavior of the target publics. This
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relationship has been shown through a series of
comparisons. Since the material designed for a given
target public is, in fact, being read by the public,
it may be concluded that the designed or manifest
purpose of the magazine is being achieved.
Approach magazine, therefore, has fulfilled
the requirements established for an effective com-
munications medium. The magazine^ content is designed
to carry out the stated editorial purpose. Material
designed for the various target publics is read by
those target publics. It is therefore argued that
Approa ch is an effective safety communications tool,
and, as such, is worthy of emulation by other media
in the safety communications field.
The data collected provides evidence of
weakness or limitation of Approach 1 s ability to
communicate certain categories of material to certain
target publics. Obviously, all members of each target
public will not read all categories of material; that
must remain a theoretical ideal. Additional research
could provide the means for a more complete realization
of the editorial purpose of the magazine, in the author 1 !
opinion.
Why, for example, do pilots display a relative
lack of interest in maintenance material, when much
of this category is relevant, even necessary, to the
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standard of performance required of the professional
aviator? What are the factors which cause one out of
three aircrewmen to skip the maintenance material?
Why does a higher percentage of aircrewmen who read
Approach regularly prefer the flight operations
material to maintenance material? What part does
ego-defense play in the attitude of pilots and air-
crewmen toward the material in the aero -medical
category? These are but a few of the questions raised
by an analysis of the data collected. All invite
further research.
Summary
Prom a comparison of the stated editorial
aims of the magazine with its evident purpose deter-
mined by content analysis, it was concluded that
Approach is designed to carry out the stated purpose
in most major dimensions.
Content analysis furnished evidence to
support one of the hypotheses: material in Approach
is designed to appeal to a specific target audience.
This was apparent from the topics presented, the levels
of presentation, and the jargon used, in several of
the material categories,
A second hypothesis stated that: material is
read in direct proportion to its relevance to the in-
dividual reader 1 s job or interest, A standard statis-
tical test of significance (chi-square) was applied to
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certain of the data resulting from the readership
survey in order to test this hypothesis. In two
cases, significance was obtained. A cross-relation-
ship of aircrewmen and maintenance personnel with the
aero-medical and maintenance categories produced sig-
nificance at the ,05 level. Comparing pilots with
maintenance personnel in the flight operations and
maintenance categories produced significance at the
.001 level. A third comparison produced insufficient
evidence to reject the null hypothesis. This compar-
ison was made between pilots and aircrewmen and their
readership of the maintenance and flight operations
categories. The resulting chi-square nearly reached
significance at the .05 level. The hypothesis was
accepted.
The final hypothesis—that Approach is an
effective communications medium—was proven through
a series of comparisons. As operationally defined for
this study, communication effectiveness could be
proven if it could be shown that material in Approach
was designed to support the stated goals of the magazine
editors, and that the material so designed was actually
read by the target public for which it was intended.
Comparison of the stated goals with the evident or
manifest purpose showed that the magazine was designed
to carry out the editorial purpose. The readership
survey provided documentation of the fact that material

67
is read by the target public for which it was designed.
Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted.
Certain unexpected anomalies occurred in the
data resulting from the readership study which invite
further research. Several questions raised by the
findings of this study could provide guidance for
subsequent research: these were listed above.
Approach appears to be an effective and
successful communications tool in a field where success
is vital but rare. Some of the characteristics which
may contribute to its success are its varied content,
high readability, use of personal narrative, and
presentation of timely material which is of interest
to its target publics. The mission of Approach as a
communications medium is both difficult and vital.





There is no known set of rules which, when
followed, guarantee a successful communications effort.
Communication between persons involves the use of
language which interposes numerous barriers. In
addition, that extremely complex entity known as the
human individual is a necessary part of the commun-
ications process. Each individual possesses a cog-
nitive structure unlike any other. Furthermore, com-
munication on a subject such as aviation safety is apt
to be met with indifference, disinterest, or an ego-
defensive reaction. Approach magazine has accepted
this challenge; it attempts to communicate with
240,000 such individuals.
The completed study of Approach indicated
that it is an effective communications medium. The
suggestions and recommendations which follow are
directed toward improving this enviable record.
On Readability: Approach is highly readable.
It can be made more so by constant striving toward
the ideal formula of short fifteen word sentences,
conversational language consisting of 75fo one-syllable




words. Since each copy of Approach Is designed for
ten readers, each reader is not free to peruse the
magazine at leisure. If he can get the message
quickly , more material may be read in a given time.
This would increase the coverage of target publics,
of material read by individual members of the publics,
or both.
On Content Design: Material in the main-
tenance category is apparently designed for maintenance
personnel. The design is so successful that the other
target publics
—
pilots and aircrewmen—exhibit a relative
lack of interest in this category. Much of the material
presented represents knowledge required in the per-
formance of duty by members of these publics, especially
pilots. It is therefore recommended that an attempt
be made to redesign the material in this category in
order to create more reader interest among the pilots.
Material in the aero -medical category should
receive wider dissemination than the readership survey
indicates that it does. Again, a re-evaluation of the
design standard is indicated, with a view toward
raising reader interest among all three target publics.
The content analysis indicates that perhaps the tech-
nical levels of presentation and the topics chosen
are responsible for the readership level among the
aircrewmen. A more simplified presentation of the
more complex subjects, such as dysbarisra or hypoxia,
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would enable thetn to find this category more readable.
An attempt might be made to employ more of the devices
used in the hazardous experience category to commun-
icate the aero-medical material of significance.
On Treatment of Individuals: The factor
of the individual in aviation accident prevention
remains the most critical area. Much of the raeterial
found in the flight operations and maintenance categor-
ies did not stress the vital role of the individual
as much as it might have. Individual responsibility,
workmanship, initiative, and skill are factors which
loom large in modern aviation. Of these factors, only
one may be taught. The others are gained through
precept and example. More attention to the individual
factor, especially in the categories mentioned, would
aid in the accomplishment of the magazine T s goals.
On Research: Several problem areas were
illuminated by this study and several unanswered
questions emerged. Further research is invited by
these, both for the general insights into communications
behavior which might be Involved, and for the specific
aims of improving the effectiveness of Approach as a
safety communications tool.
Additional research would aid in the re-
designing of the material in the maintenance category,
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if it could be determined why pilots do not read the
present material in one out of three cases.
As noted previously, research into the
motivations of the aircrewmen should prove extremely
worthwhile. In addition to explaining the high read-
ership of the flight operations category by this public,
insights might be gained which would prove valuable in
the selection and training of aircrew candidates.
Such a study should also attempt to uncover the reasons
for the surprising lack of interest exhibited by the
aircrewmen in the maintenanc e category of material
presented in Approach ,
A final study suggested would attempt to
determine the effects of the personal narratives of
hazardous experiences on those who read them. The
results of this study would provide guidelines for
the employment of this device in other categories
of material presented. Furthermore, such information
would aid in defining the parameters of the influence
exercised by personal narratives when employed in this
manner.
On the Study Method: The method designed for
this study was found to be practical, flexible, and
more than adequate for the task. Although the result-
ing measurement of communication effectiveness is some-
what subjective, it is better than none at all. The
flexibility of the method renders it applicable to
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larger or smaller communications problems. If more
precision is required, it may be obtained by a more
complete and exhaustive measurement of the actual
achievement of the communication among its target
audience, A lengthy, subjective interview, pretested
for validity and reliability, could be employed with a
large stratified random sample of readership for
extreme precision, for example.
This study method is recommended in cases
where a measurement of communication effectiveness
is required in solving a problem involving media
selection, message content and influence, or content
design. Its advantages are felt to outweigh its
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Midairs O RAMP STRIKE! O
o SAFETY-a Religious Subject? o
Preventing FOP O JUST a COLD
The Great Murgatroyd Frunch Scandal
BRUARY 1963

by LCDR J. R. Foster
Ramp Strike!
Tanding accidents account for nearly half of all
-"-^ naval aviation accidents and a type of landing
accident which continues to occur at an alarming
rate is the ramp strike. By necessity, all carrier
aviators must fly over a man-made steel "cliff," some
60 feet in height and just 100 feet from the landing
point on every carrier landing approach. Night and
day this formidable barrier presents itself. Even with
modern landing aids such as the mirror, the Fresnel
Lens, the Plat System and, of course, the LSO, hold-
ing a light switch and mike in place of his paddles,
pilots of high-performance aircraft fail at times to
make the flight deck level.
With glide slope information continuously trans-
mitted to the pilot and a qualified LSO observing
each pass and capable of initiating an immediate
waveoff, how does a pilot allow himself to fly into
the ramp? The factors are many and varied but
ultimately the final controlling factor is the pilot.
Let's take a look at some recent ramp strikes and
note the lessons to be learned.
The Case of The No. 1 Wire
The pilot was on his fifth approach during night
CarQuals. He had a total of two night arrestments.
The approach was on speed, on altitude and line-up
was good until just short of the deck. An amber ap-
proach light had been observed until a slight fast or
red approach light was seen as the aircraft was close
in to the ramp. The LSO had transmitted during the
approach, "no lower; hold up your nose, power,
power" SPN-12 recorded an airspeed of 142 knots.
The aircraft struck the rounddown of the carrier
deck with the main landing gear and as it skidded
up the deck, flashes and muffled explosions were ob-
served. The plane settled off the angled deck and the
pilot was not recovered.
During day refresher landings this pilot was con-
sistently trapped by the No. 1 cross-deck pendant.
This was the result of the pilot being low at the ramp
and spotting the deck. The LSO had continuously
stressed this to the pilot on his debriefings which in-
cluded reviewing the PLAT System Monitor. This
pilot chose to disregard available glide slope in-
formation during the final portion of his approach
even after being warned of the possible consequences.
Another important aspect is the illusions that some-
times present themselves during a night approach.
One illusion faced by the pilot is that he is high and
possibly will land long. This usually occurs in the
very final stage of the approach and is the result of
deck lighting in the landing area and the absence
of reference points normally observed during a day
approach.
The more important illusion is the location of the
ramp lights. By nomenclature and location it is as-
sumed that they identify the stern of the ship. During
the approach the pilot observes these lights until
close in at which time they are lost because of re-
stricted visibility from the cockpit. The stimulus re-
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ceived from the peripheral vision of the pilot tells
him the ramp lights are no longer visihle and that
therefore he is clear of the ramp. Training and
knowledge should override this stimulus being fed
to the pilot and he should disregard it and continue
the approach utilizing the glide slope information
available. Unfortunately, if at the exact moment that
this stimulus occurs the pilot dives-for-the-deck or
eases the nose over to prevent that night bolter he
will not make it over the ramp successfully as demon-
strated by this accident.
The Case of the Low Ball
The catapult shot and rendezvous were normal.
During climbout, the pilot noticed the cockpit tem-
perature was colder than normal, but was endurable.
On his first approach the pilot was waved off due
to a high start. On his second approach the pilot
again had a high start and at V/2 miles was advised
by the LSO to start his rate of descent. The pilot cor-
rected down to glide slope and then passed through
it, stopping with a low ball. The LSO asked for
power to correct his glide slope. The pilot added
power to slow his rate of descent but did not correct
for the low ball.
As the aircraft passed througb the stack burble,
the LSO asked for more power. At this point the
aircraft started to decelerate and power was once
again called for by the LSO. No improvement wa>
noted and power (all was made tbree time- in rapid
succession b\ the LSO. Shortly thereafter the aircraft
struck the ramp. The aircraft continued up the deck
and made a normal engagement of the No. 2 crosa-
deck pendant.
This accident occurred simply because tin- pilot
failed to properly control the aircraft on the mirror
glide slope even with supplementary information
from the LSO. The accident board also stated the
failure of the cockpit air conditioning system con-
tributed to the accident l>\ it- adverse physiological
effa ts on the pilot.
Line-Up
The aircraft approached the ship and was ap-
proximately on centerline and at the correct alti-
The pilot called the "meatball" at which time
aircraft going low. The pilot
glide slope and the LSO then
tudt
the LSO detected the
corrected back to the
120 125 130 135 HO 145
*/5
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noticed some deceleration. A call for power was
made. The aircraft was observed at this time with
a red approach light. During the final moments of
the approach, the aircraft was observed to be low
and the LSO made several "power" transmissions,
followed immediately with a waveoff. The aircraft
struck the ramp 3 feet below the flight deck and
well to the right of centerline in a wings-level atti-
tude. Afterburner was selected shortly after striking
the ramp and the aircraft became safely airborne.
The pilot made a barricade arrestment on his next
pass.
This pilot also neglected his glide slope informa-
tion and directed his attention to only one phase of
the approach, line-up, at a critical point.
High and Fast
The pilot had completed a normal CCA and re-
ported sighting meatball at 11/4 miles. An LSO in
training, who was controlling the approach, noted the
aircraft was high and fast. At about 1 mile from the
ship the aircraft began a rapid rate of descent. The
supervising LSO told the LSO in training to get rid
of him because he was too fast—wave him off. As the
aircraft continued to close the ship, the SPN-12
radar indicated a smooth deceleration. At about ^
mile the aircraft descended well below the glide slope.
At this time the pilot realized his high sink rate and
began to add power. The LSO transmitted "no lower
—no lower
—
power, power, power." The aircraft
struck the ramp about 2 seconds later.
This pilot committed an error which has probably
been responsible for more ramp strikes than any
other—the high fast start.
The following discussion on the high fast start is
quoted from the NASC publication "Final Approach"
originally distributed June '59.
"The fast start causes the pilot to control the alti-
tude with the stick in order to stay on the glide slope
as he hacks off power to try to slow down. If he attains
the correct airspeed with the stick he is hopelessly
high on the glide slope, he has to pay for the slower
speed by maintaining or gaining altitude—even with
all his garbage out. So the pilot is fast, staying on
the glide slope with his stick, keeping the power ex-
cessively low in order to bleed off speed. What hap-
pens? See figure 1.
Thanks to PLAT tailhoolcers now have an accurate and readily avail-
able debriefing medium, free of estimates and human opinions.
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1. The pilot starts down the glide slope at Posi-
tion A. He is fast with power as shown at Al, his
angle of attack as shown at A2.
2. With the reduced power setting he slows down.
As he slows he must change the angle of attack in
order to stay on the glide slope. Positions B, Bl. B2;
C, CI, Cs; Dl, D2 shows this progress in flight path,
power required, and angle of attack.
3. At Position E the pilot sees his airspeed drop-
ping, and he knows that he will need power; so he
adds it.
4. Here, a number of factors can take over—and
these are reflected in many AARs. We list three here:
a. At E he adds power. He was decelerating rapid-
ly. In order to hold the glide slope he is hauling
back on the stick (he has been controlling altitude
with the stick—he had to). The drag is increasing at
a terrific rate at the high angles of attack so that
his need for additional power is increasing as fast as
his engine will accelerate. He is in such a position
that the only way he can go is down, down below
the glide slope. He hit the ramp.
b. At E the pilot anticipates 83% he usually needs
at Point X on the power-required curve. He puts on
the 83% and confidently waits. It's a little warmer
than usual. The port wing didn't dump all the fuel.
In short, for various reasons about 85% to 86% is
needed. The pilot finds himself at speed X with a
slight power deficiency, decelerating AND easing his
nose up to stay on the glide slope—after all, that is
the way he had been holding on glide slope all the
way down.
The drag went up; so did the power, but not fast
enough. This boy was lucky. He hit the ramp with the
end of his aircraft, knocked off the hook, bent the
tail cone, but he managed to bolter and made it to
a land base.
c. At E the pilot guessed right. He adds the right
amount of power, and lucks in. He tells all the pilots
that he made it because he knows what he is doing,
and he encourages the youngsters to try it. We'll get
the AARs on the youngsters he convinces
—
and even-
tually we'll get his, too."
Wind-Over-Deck
Much has been said about the airflow disturbance
aft of the ramp or burble and its effect on carrier
approaches. The following quote is taken from the
NATC Final Report on Project No. RSSH-3100S,
Optimum Wind-Over-Deck for Shipboard Recoven
Operations with Carrier Based Airplanes:
"Airflow disturbance aft of the ramp and in the
landing area is one of the most significant adverse
influences on the pilot's ability to make a precise
final approach and landing. Airflow disturbances aft
of the ramp, or burble, may be generally described
as a downdraft of varying intensity immediately aft
of the ramp, followed by a resultant updraft of vary-
ing and shifting location in the vicinity of 1000 feet
astern. Burble and airflow disturbance in the landing
area are caused by a relationship of fixed and vari-
able factors, some of which are sufficiently within
the operational commander's control to minimize
their adverse effects.
Ship design characteristics vary considerably
among classes and exert a significant influence on
the air mass through which the pilot must fly. The
magnitude and direction of the WOD is the most
significant variable influencing airflow disturbances.
It has been determined that for a given magnitude
of WOD that the airflow in the landing area is
steadiest when the relative wind direction is parallel
to the angled deck centerline. Starboard recovery
crosswinds are accompanied by relative wind velo-
cities in the landing area considerably lower than
those recorded by superstructure mounted anemo-
meters. Airflow conditions in the landing area im-
prove when the magnitude of the WOD is reduced.
The burble aft of the ramp becomes stronger when
the magnitude of the WOD increases; the angle be-
tween the relative wind and the angle-deck centerline
increases; the natural wind component increases for
a given WOD. Other variable factors influencing
airflow disturbance include flight deck spot, air-
craft exhaust or prop wash over the deck and natural
turbulence.
Glide slope and lateral corrections required by
the pilot increase with increased WOD. Upon first
entering the burble with the high WOD (above 35
kts) airplanes generally experience a significant up-
ward displacement from the glide slope followed by a
downward displacement near the carrier ramp. The
downdraft effect is also a function of the airplane's
position on the glide slope at the time of transiting
the downdraft; a low position results in a deeper
penetration of the burble and maximum downdraft
>ffect. All pilots reported that regardless of the model
airplane being flown, the tendency for the airplane
to go low on the glide slope increased considerably
as WOD increased above 25 kts and 15 kts for jet
and propeller airplanes, respectively. The pilot con-
trol requirement is greater for low approach air-
speed and lower wing loading airplanes.
To counteract the tendency of the airplane to go
low during high values of WOD, all pilots antici-
pated the effects of downdraft by adding power ap-
proximately 400 feet from the ramp. The amount of
power addition varied among airplanes of different
models. Generally, an increase of about 4-6% rpm
was sufficient to maintain glide slope for jet airplanes
at WOD values in excess of 25 knots."
It is urged that all carrier aviators read this study
thoroughly for its excellent discussion of the influ-
ences of this airflow disturbance on the carrier ap-
proach and landing.
Some Basic Conclusions
This short rehash of ramp strikes is intended only
to bring to mind some of the more common errors
made in the past, and which are still being made at
present, in an attempt to eliminate them in the
future.
Making a good carrier approach everytime, day
or night, is the hallmark of a naval aviator. It
doesn't come easy. There is no magic formula or
short cut to reach this goal. Training, practice and
the constant desire of the individual to make each
and every approach and landing a perfect one is the
first step. Maintaining complete timely knowledge of
the factors affecting the approach is a continual proc-
• Fly the glide slope all the way down to the deck.
It will put you at the right place at the right time
for a safe arrestment. Don't be content with anything
except a centered meatball all the way. You can't
miss.
• Watch those illusions especially at night. Be-
lieve the glide slope info on the approach as you do
your instruments during instrument flight conditions.
Easing the power off or the nose over at the ramp
because of an illusion of being high or the desire
to get aboard without a bolter on a dark night is
asking for a piece of ramp. Power and plenty of it
is the proper correction for a dropping mealhall near
the ramp.
• Concentrate on the whole approach at all times.
Don't direct your attention to one part, such as
line-up, at the expense of ignoring glide slope infor-
mation especially during the last few seconds of the
approach. Keep those last minute corrections small
and smooth. Large ones will be unnecessary if you've
been flying a good approach from the start.
• Beware of high fast starts. Reducing power to
slow down and controlling the altitude with stick to
get down to the glide slope can result in the bottom
falling out of the approach at the ramp. It's happened
before. The perfect approach calls for being set up
at the very beginning of the approach. Minor cor-
rections only should be necessary when you're com-
ing down the glide slope.
• Know the peculiarities of your aircraft when it's
in the landing configuration and at the speeds nor-
mally used in the approach. This includes having a
thorough understanding of the aerodynamics in-
volved for the aircraft descending on the glide slope.
• Be ready for a waveoff during the final phase
of the approach. Be wary of the natural inclination
to haul the nose up for a waveoff especially when
approaching the backside of the power-required
curve.
• Be attentive to the information you receive from
the LSO both during the approach and in his de-
briefing. There are more old pilots around who have
heeded his advice than there are those who did
not. The gent back on the platform is there because
he knows the business. His function is not to fly
your approach but to aid you in a timely manner.
With the advent of PLAT the LSO can now show
you as well as tell you your errors immediately after
they happen.
• Review the written word on the carrier ap-
proach. Your operations officer can supply you with
many fine Naval Air Test Center reports. The reader
is also referred to the following information:
"Mirror Report" (approach April '57)
"Meatball and Paddles'' (approach Jun '58)
"The Pilot vs. the Pitching Deck" < approach Nov '60
1
"The Other Way To Stop" (approach Feb '61)
"Carrier Landing Facts" (NavWeps 00-80J-1)
"The Carrier Landing Story" (approach July '61)
"The Late Waveoff in Jet Aircraft" (approach Feb '62)




by LCDR Wayne N. Derrick, CHC
•T*he Bible says, ''Faith, Hope, and Love abide, these
*• three; but the greatest of these is love." (Revised
Standard Version 1 Cor. 13:13). The Bible does
not say "Faith, Hope, and Safety—the greatest of
these is safety." However, in the context of the word
"love"—as used in the Bible—certainly safety is
implied.
Recently. I had the privilege of participating in a
ceremony in which one of our fine squadrons (HU-1)
received a Chief of Naval Operations's Safety Award
for the third consecutive year. My part was to
offer the opening prayer. As I mused over the as-
signment, the thought occurred to me that in non-
religious terminology we substitute the words "SAFE-
TY" for "love." We mean "love" but, in the man's
world in which we find ourselves one does not use
the word "love" in our relationship with one another.
Oh, we allow the chaplain to speak of "brotherly
love," but we want him to keep this in the confines of
the chapel.
However, it seems to me that the parachute rigger
who meticulously folds pleats and lines; the machin-
ist who pays close attention to the tension readings
on his torque wrench; the landing signalman careful-
ly watching landing gear and weather conditions; or
the pilot who safety-checks passengers, cargo and
plane, is in a real sense expressing "love" for his
fellow man. Each is deeply concerned for the men
who look to him for their very lives.
Conversely, one might say, the man who has no
love for his fellow man expresses his hatred (I choose
strong word) for others by the manner in which
he handles details, either by neglect or indifference.
His failure to accept responsibility in those matters
may mean the difference between life or death, com-
fort or tension, loss or gain.
Dr. Ralph W. Sockman in "The Higher Happiness"
.relates an incident which occurred at the 1948 Olym-
pic games. In a relay race, the French team had
started well. But as the baton was being passed to
one of the subsequent runners, he dropped it. The
accident, of course, put the team out of the running.
The runner at fault went into hysterics. Think of
what this meant to the two runners who preceded
him and whose work was ruined by his accident!
And there was the runner who was to follow but
never got the chance. And then, there were fifty
million Frenchmen struck dumb by this blunder.
As I am writing this, Walter Shirra has landed
in the Pacific within a matter of minutes from the
deck of USS kearsarge. Six orbits, consuming less
than ten hours flight time, taking him 162,000 miles
and returning him safely to earth indicates to me
that all the men and all the hours and all the
check-off lists involved in the flight of S-7 had, as
their basic foundation, a great love and respect for
this man upon which we, as a nation, pinned our
hopes. One announcer stated during the watching
hours, "Millions of prayers are being offered for
his (Shirra's) safe return." One man anywhere along
the line of preparation who was not filled with
brotherly concern for Walter Shirra, his wife and
children, his parents, or our nation, could have
"dropped the baton" by neglect, carelessness, or lack
of responsibility and, in a very real sense, a low
blow would have been struck not only at the Shirra
family but at the free world from which it might
have reeled in confusion for months, even years.
John Donne put the same thing poetically when
he said, "Never send to know for whom the bell
tolls ... it tolls for thee." As indeed it does when-
ever we fail to practice that rule on which all pro-
grams of safety/love are built: "Do unto other as
you would have them do unto you." Our lack of con-
cern for any of our fellow creatures places him in
a most dangerous position, and when he is in danger,
we are in danger too.
Thus, you see, we are so related to each other that
to practice "pure religion undefiled" one will apply
and practice rules of safety. One cannot be a man of






"Just a cold" spells aching miseries in anybody's
language. But where other folks can doctor them-
selves with any one or all of the pills, capsules,
gargles and sprays on TV last week and can corner
the kleenex market until the whole thing blows
over, matters are not so simple for pilots and air-
crewmen.
Where an airman is concerned, a cold is not just
a cold. It is something that can interfere with his
ability to perform his job and, as such, it can be a
threat to his safety and the safety of his aircraft.
Aside from the hazards of self-medication which
we will discuss later, a cold can have two effects at
altitude:
• A cold can close up your ear ducts or Eustachi-
an tubes and make it impossible for you to
clear your ears. This in turn can lead to con-
siderable pain, inflammation of the middle ear
and in rare cases, inflight rupture of the ear
drum. It can also cause vertigo.
• A cold increases the possibility of an incapaci-
tating sinus block in flight.
Structure of the Normal Ear
Colds cause ear trouble because of the way the ear
is put together.
The ear is an air-filled, closed cavity with pressure
equalization possible only when the Eustachian tube
connecting the middle ear and throat is opened. (See
Fig. 1.) The Eustachian tube narrows where it joins
the throat. This narrowing operates in much the same
manner as a flutter or flapper valve. It lets air out
of the middle ear more easily than it lets air in. (See
Fig. 2.)
During ascent, the air in your middle ear expands
as external atmospheric pressure decreases. Under
normal conditions, excess air passes out through your
Eustachian tubes without difficulty. When this hap-
pens you may hear a snapping noise in your ear
or feel as if bubbles are moving through the tube.
When external atmospheric pressure increases dur-
ing descent, narrowing of the Eustachian tube acting
as a flutter valve prevents entry of air. You can
usually equalize the pressure in your middle ear by
yawning, by swallowing or by yelling. These actions
contract the muscles which open your Eustachian
tubes and allow air to rush into your middle ear.
The Cold-Affected Ear
But what happens when your Eustachian tubes are
swollen because of a cold, sinus trouble or even an
allergy and you are unable to clear your ears?
approach/February 1963
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"Valves," are o.k. and
you descend, the
"Valves" open, (when
you clear your ears)
and admit equalizing
pressure.
If you have a cold






F YOU HAVE A COLD-HAVE YOUR VALVES (EUSTACHIANS) CHECKED
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During ascent you become aware of positive pres-
sures in the middle ear as a feeling of fullness. As
pressure in the ear increases, discomfort increases
and there may be a steady hissing or roaring noise
or a crackling and snapping. Occasionally there may
be actual pain and mild vertigo. However, air usually
vents off through the Eustachian tube even though
the tube is swollen.
During descent when your Eustachian tubes are
swollen and you are unable to clear your ears, nega-
tive pressure builds up in the middle ear. As pressure
differentials increase, ringing becomes marked and
there is usually dizziness with nausea. Pain is very
severe and radiates out from the ear. Deafness is
marked and dizziness and ringing usually increase
though the latter may disappear.
Increasing differential pressure can result in rup-
ture of the eardrum—an experience which has been
compared to being hit on the side of the head with
a plank. A loud explosion is both felt and heard in
the affected ear; there is a sharp, piercing pain on
the affected side; dizziness and nausea become
marked ; and collapse or generalized shock may fol-
low. When the eardrum ruptures, hearing is dimin-
ished. Acute pain subsides, but a dull ache per-
sists from 12 to 48 hours.
Sinus Blockage
The necessity for equalizing air pressure also ex-
ists in the sinuses and blockage by the effects of a
cold or an allergy produces similar problems. If
sinus openings are obstructed by swelling of the
mucous membrane lining, pressure equalization be-
comes impossible. Resulting pain can be slight or
it can be unbearable.
Unlike the ears, the sinuses are affected by ascent
and descent almost equally. Depending on which
sinuses are involved, pain can extend over the fore-
head above the bridge of the nose, on either side of
the nose in the cheekbones or even in the upper
jaw teeth. Though the pain is similar to that caused
by ordinary sinusitis on the ground, it can be much
more severe when sinus blockage is sudden during
rapid change in altitude.
Self-Medication
When tempted to "doctor" your cold or sinus
trouble and then fly, our advice to you is "Don't."
Ordinary remedies can produce effects which can
be dangerous to a pilot or crewman at altitude. (An
allied problem in aviation is the possibility or errors
of omission or commission by support personnel who
are sick but are taking all kinds of cold remedies
and are still on the job.)
Antihistamines, for instance, which are contained
in tablets, capsules and even in some cough medi-
cines, are particularly dangerous to flying personnel.
Response to an average dose of an antihistamine
drug an \ar\ from no effect at all to marked drowsi-
ii* —
- reduced alertness and even mental depression.
Antihistamines can adversely affect depth perception
and equilibrium and can reduce perceptual motor
skills such as eye-hand coordination.
Cold compounds which contain quinine can pro-
duce ringing of the ears and dizziness. Certain nose
drops contain drugs which primarily constrict the
blood vessels within the nose, increase blood pres-
sure and pulse rate and even cause the "jitters."
Some nose drops can produce incoordination and
visual disturbances. Sulfa drugs and analgesics or
pain killers such as aspirin are thought by some per-
sons to lower resistance to hypoxia.
Though colds can plague us at any time of the
year, we are now at the height of the "cold season."
Don't take your colds to the drug store pharmacist
and don't take your colds to altitude—take them to
your squadron flight surgeon. A few days on the
deck to cure a cold is better than being grounded for
weeks because of post-flight complications.
References:
Aviation Medicine Practice (NavPers 10839-A). USAF Flight
Surgeon's Manual (AF Manual 160-5). Aerospace Medicine Arm-




Item: AFTER an HUS 1 lost power and autorota-
ted into the water, all three crewmembers escaped un-
injured.
On surfacing the pilot attempted to inflate his
life vest. Pulling the right toggle failed to actuate
the CO2 cartridge. He was unable to locate the left
toggle which had been secured inside the cover flap
of the CO2 actuator housing cover. Unsnapping the
cover, he released and actuated the toggle. There was
a hissing noise of escaping CO2. The vest failed to
inflate.
The pilot used his and the crew chief's hard hats
for flotation by placing his arms through the chin
straps and inverting the helmets. The three men were
rescued by SAR helicopter.
Examination of the pilot's life vest showed that
t Hard Hat
both screwdown cartridge container cap covers were
loose. The pilot stated that he had not preflighted
his life vest. After the cap cover was tightened, the
right C02 cartridge was actuated and the vest in-
flated successfully. Following replacement with a
fresh C02 cartridge on the left side and tightening the
cap cover, actuation of the cartridge and inflation of
the vest occurred as expected.
Preflight your personal equipment as you would
your aircraft.
Item: A pilot was taxiing an OE-1 from the com-
pass rose to the squadron's line, a distance of about
one mile. When the right brake assembly become hot,
he shut down and debarked from the aircraft. When
almost clear of the aircraft he slipped and fell. His
APH-5 helmet struck the horizontal stabilizer with
force sufficient to cause damage to the outboard two
feet of the elevator. He was uninjured.
Item: After ejection and parachute descent, an
F8U pilot landed in a wooded swampy area. His feet
hit a large tree about 10' above the ground, then
his head struck the trunk with great force.
"It was a good thing I had cinched up my helmet
during parachute descent," he later stated. "Other-
wise that knock on the head by the tree would have
probably killed me."
Item: The aircrewman's S/PH-1 helmet served as
good protection when he was being hauled up the
Jacob's ladder. The ship was rolling to such a degree
that he hit his head against the side several times.
Item: As the rescue destroyer slowly approached
the survivors of an HSS accident, crewmembers lin-
ing the forward port rail threw out life preservers.
One of the preservers struck the pilot on the head.
He believes the blow might have injured him had he
not retained his hard hat. •
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Turnabout
primer for pilots - number 9
Helicopter pilots may be as lucky in love as fighter and attack
pilots, but since these are nonreportable statistics under the provi-
sions of the current OpNav 3750, fixed wing pilots wanting to have
some fun with the rotating types are advised as follows
—
just ask
them the important numbers associated with varying bank angles.
by Major H.G.C. Henneberger
"E'ixed wing pilots are all too familiar with the fixed wing aircraft it is doubtful that helicopter
*- theory that as bank angle increases there is a people are as familiar with the theory as their fixed
corresponding increase in stalling speed. Since heli- wing brethren,
copters don't have the same stall characteristics as Load factor or "G", however, increases with bank
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angle in a helicopter in exactly the same way it does
for any other aircraft. Correspondingly, the power
required to hold airspeed in the bank without losing
altitude increases. If the pilot doesn't come in with
that extra power at the precise moment it is needed
he further complicates the power problem and he
either begins to settle or lose airspeed. If he holds
airspeed he will settle, if he holds altitude he will
lose airspeed. If he is heavily loaded he may not
have the extra power to spare and if he is close to
the deck he will undoubtedly succumb to the urge
to come in with collective. The story from here on is
all too familiar to helicopter pilots—another loss-of-
turns accident.
Helicopter pilots should be just as familiar with the
important numbers associated with bank angles in
their particular machine as fixed wing pilots are.
Ask any jet driver what percent increase in stall
speed is generated in a clean 30-degree bank over
the break in his bird and he can probably tell you.
But ask the average helicopter pilot what percent in-
crease in apparent gross weight is generated in a
30-degree bank for his bird and the odds are that he
can't tell you.
The load factor and hence apparent gross weight
increase in banks up to 30 degrees is relatively small.
But even so, under the right set of adverse circum-
stances such as high density altitude, gusty air, poor
pilot technique and high gross weight, a power
deficit could easily be induced. Above 30 degrees of
bank the apparent increase in gross weight soars. At
30 degrees of bank the apparent increase is only 16%
but at 60 degrees it is 100%. We all know that the
bank limitation on most helicopters is 30 degrees,
but we know too that helicopter people are famous
for ignoring this limitation. Perhaps if they were
familiar with the numbers involved they would have
more respect for the limitation.
Apparent Weight Increase Over Initial Gross
Bank Load Factor HUS* HUP* HOK* HRS* % Increase
10° 1.02 226 106 118 150 2%
20° 1.06 678 318 354 450 6%
30° 1.16 1808 850 945 1200 16%
40° 1.3 3390 1600 1770 2250 30%
45° 1 .42 4750 2225 2470 3150 42%
50° 1.55 6200 2900 3250 4100 55%
55° 1.74 8370 3900 4370 5500 74%
60° 2.00 11,300 5300 5900 7500 100%
H-34 (HUS) loaded initially to 1,300 bs
UH-25 (HUP) loaded initially tc 5300 ba.
OH-43D (HOK loaded i nitially to 5900 lbs.
CH-19E (HRS) loaded initially to 7500 lbs.
Load Factor = L/W = \/COs6: for 6 = 30°
COS0 = 0.866: LF = 1.16
Load factor developed in a turn could be limited by
the following:
a. Limit load factor of structure.
b. Power available to maintain altitude and airspeed.
c. Blade stall.
At lower left is a rough load factor breakdown on
some of our fleet helicopters at various angles of bank.
Included is the apparent weight increase over a given
gross weight in straight and level flight.
There are other problems associated with the me-
chanics of the banked turn in helicopters such as re-
treating blade stall and structural stress at high
gross weights. The most pressing problem from the
accident prevention point of view is power manage-
ment. We have a good idea of how many helicopter
power management accidents there have been. What
we don't know is, how many of our tired old birds
have had their guts nearly pulled out when the pilot
induced a power deficit in a low speed steep bank
and was lucky enough to get away with it. We can't
help but wonder how many of these same birds were
later involved in engine failure accidents. •
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MIDAIRS
r 1 1here are all sorts of ways to bang up an airplane
~ around an airfield—wheels-up, landing short or
long. . . . However, the greatest potential for death
and destruction is the midair collision in the traffic
pattern and that situation is aggravated where air-
craft at the same field are operating under different
frequencies—some on tower and some on GCA or
MLP.
There are four in that split-communication cate-
gory:
• Fall 1961
One A-3 (A3D) was in right-hand MLP pattern
to the runway. Another A-3 was on straight-in GCA
to the same runway. Midair collision occurred 2V2
miles on final. Six dead, two A-3s destroyed.
• Winter 1961
C-47 (R4D) was making GCA to runway 8. S-2
(S2F) was making left-hand VFR approach to run-
way 4. Tower told S-2 to make immediate right turn
but no traffic advisory about C-47 issued. Right
turn not started and sudden sight of C-47 apparently
startled S-2 pilot who stalled, spun to right. Two
dead, one S-2 destroyed.
• Mid-summer 1962
Two F-9s (F9F) executing simulated precautionary
approach under tower control. C-119 making go-
around from GCA was downwind under RATTC
control. Tower did not inform F-9s of C-119. RATTC
did not inform C-119 of F-9s. One F-9 struck C-119.
Both aircraft damaged but landed safely.
• Summer 1962
TF-9J (F9F-8T) was making GCA. Small trainer
was making touch-and-go. No traffic advisory issued
to pilot of either aircraft. TF-9J collided with trainer
on upwind end of runway 350 feet above the ground.
One dead, both aircraft destroyed.
This list might have been longer except for the
element often called "luck" and we are able to call
them "near-misses." Some seven incidents of this
nature have been officially reported in the past sev-
eral years.
• Spring 1960
F-9 called tower from 4 miles out. Pilot saw two
A-4s level and closing, rolled and dived to avoid.
Upon inquiry tower advised they were radar traffic.
• Summer 1960
S-2 on GCA final in clouds at 800 feet. TC-45
(SNB) below clouds maintaining VFR under tower
control. Near-miss as S-2 broke out of clouds.





Civil Constellation (C-121) making night ASR
told to break off at 4 miles and contact tower and
make circling approach to runway 10. C-121 failed
I
to break left or contact tower. S-2 (S2F) had been
cleared by tower to break at upwind end of runway
10. C-121 passed under S-2 in head-on pass.
I*
Winter 1961
C-54 (R5D) maneuvering to land on runway 31
following actual IFR approach. Tower cleared EC-




P-2 (P2V) on GCA and cleared to land. Nearing
I
touchdown when GCA gave waveoff. Tower had
cleared an A-l (AD) for takeoff and instructed him
to switch to departure frequency. Near-miss over
I
field in instrument conditions.
• Spring 1962
E-l (WF-2) under GCA on 2-mile final. P-2
(P2V) on tower frequency maneuvering to land
I
after GCA. Near-miss at 500 feet altitude.
• Spring 1962
H-34 (HUS) making night practice GCA. On
I
short final, GCA advised H-34 of S-2 (S2F) in pat-
tern; S-2 was actually on final. Seconds after traffic
advisory, helo plane commander took controls and
executed abrupt right turn to avoid the overtaking
S-2.
I Obviously, these are not the only near-misses
which have taken place. Conversation with nearly
(any aviator can bring out a case which happened
to him personally. The situation is serious enough
to prompt CNO to recently order all Naval Air Sta-
tions and Air Facilities to "objectively review the
coordination procedures and practices between
RATTC, GCA units, LSO and towers for adequate
communication links, appropriate instructions and
ATC personnel training programs."
The air operations system we now have is a good
e. It works. Listening to an explanation of what
equipment is used and how the tower and GCA/
RATTC coordinate airspace in the traffic pattern, the
possibilities of a mid-air sound so remote as to be
compared to the chance of winning all the silver
dollars in Nevada. How then, does a midair or near-
miss come to be?
Lest we be too quick to condemn tower operators
(they are in the minority and could be outvoted by
Kilots) let's make sure that the pilot is aware of his
wn area of responsibility. Here is an unofficial re-
port on a pilot who failed to heed his clearance and
endangered the lives of five people in two aircraft,
plus about two million dollars worth of airplane.
A jet was on a GCA to a full stop. The radar
coordinator had requested a full stop landing from
the local controller in the tower when the jet reached
three miles from the end of the runway. At this
time, a prop aircraft had just been cleared for take-
off by the local controller. He cleared the jet to land
full stop. The prop aircraft delayed takeoff for about
one minute due to radio difficulty then began rolling
with the jet approximately one mile from touchdown.
Since the prop would be airborne quickly and the
jet would be slowing after touchdown, the local con-
troller was not overly concerned about the close
proximity of aircraft. However, the jet pilot decided
to make a touch-and-go instead of a full stop. Fol-
lowing his "crash and dash" he turned his attention
to getting tower frequency for landing and failed to
note his jet rapidly overtaking the prop aircraft
ahead. According to the prop pilot, the jet swooshed
by with less than 30 feet clearance.
Such a small thing, deciding to make a touch-and-
go instead of the expected full stop, at least it seemed
small from the pilot's point of view. Suppose though,
the ending had been different. That small decision
would have loomed large in an accident investiga-
tion. We would have read transcripts of the GCA and
tower tapes plus statements of witnesses and partici-
pants.
Fortunately, an accident did not take place. But if
it had, we can predict with reasonable certainty that
the accident board would pay particular attention to
what was said to each of the pilots by their respec-
tive controllers and what was said between the air-
controlmen coordinating the two aircraft.
Several questions would be asked: Did either pilot
receive information about the other aircraft? Did
the tower originally pass "traffic information" to
GCA and revise it when the takeoff delay appeared?
Was there an attempt to warn the prop pilot or to
use Guard channel to alert the jet pilot once the
situation developed?
How can we be sure an investigation would fol-
low these lines? Because it went that way in all four
of the accidents previously mentioned. And what did
investigators find in those accidents? The most com-
mon element was an absence of timely advisories to
the pilots concerning conflicting traffic. This fact ap-
plies to the near-misses as well.
Was absence of traffic advisories significant? The
individual accident boards thought so. In each of the
accidents there were recommendations to increase
,
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this service. One recommendation, which may be
taken as representing the feeling of the others, said:
"Reemphasize to tower personnel the necessity of in-
forming pilots in the landing pattern as to the posi-
tion of conflicting traffic. Any error in the passing of
information to the pilot should be on the side of too
much rather than too little."
Are traffic advisories an actual part of the aircon-
trolman's duties? Yes, they are. The Air Traffic Pro-
cedures manual, ATP 71 10.1A, is used by both mili-
tary and civil controllers and section 411.1 of that
manual gives the basic authority for the issuance
of such advisories.
As a general rule, civil towers are more likely to
issue advisories than are Navy towers.
i
Now, before you Air Controlmen start sending .
bombs to approach under separate cover of night. I
consider the experience of one pilot. While it may
not represent your cab, it illustrates a trend which
appears to be widespread.
This pilot was at the 180 and reported the usual
"gear down and locked." The tower operator re-
sponded with the usual "cleared to land, recheck
gear down and locked." Shortly thereafter, on base
leg, the pilot glimpsed a multi-engine prop aircraft
apparently making a long straight-in to the same run-
way. When the pilot inquired about this strange
traffic, the tower operator replied, "He's on a practice
GCA, continue your approach."
traffic pattern
"C^ollowing several midair collisions in the traffic
-*• pattern, the commands concerned came to the
painful conclusion that deficiencies may have existed
in air traffic procedures for their fields. In general
these apparent deficiencies concerned landing priori-
ties or restrictions on various types of traffic using
the same field.
First-come, first-served has a long tradition of use
and this may be why the subject of landing priorities
is a distasteful one to practically everybody in the
cockpit. Whenever a field establishes priorities or re-
strictions a tug of war surges under the surface:
Tailhookers about to deploy feel MLP is the most
important thing, people working on radar approaches
dispute this strongly as do those arriving on flight
plans with a low code aboard.
Actually, it's difficult to decide which type of op-
eration is most important or least important. But if it
must be decided, air station personnel responsible
for air traffic usually get caught in the middle. So the
subject becomes distasteful to them also.
Some decisions which station personnel have had
to make are:
• Shall practice radar approaches be made to an
off-duty runway where a crossing situation with nor-
mal traffic will exist? If so, are minimum altitudes
and waveoff distances/directions clearly indicated? I
• When practice radar approaches and MLP are'
being made to the same runway, who has priority?
• Is a "low pass" or "low approach" following a|
radar approach clearly defined and understood by
j
GCA and tower personnel? Unless acknowledged by
the pilot, a clearance to cross the field not below a.
specified altitude (400, 500, . . .) may be confused!
with the altitude used for radar minimums.
• What weather minimums are set for MLP? Im
various Airfield Operations Manuals the ceilings
range from 600 to 1200 feet; visibilities appear
J
standardized at 2 miles.
• Are weather minimums set for practice radar?
approaches? (One field sets 2000/4 or better as re-
quired for practice radar runs)
.
• When MLP is in progress and the tower has-
landing VFR traffic to the same runway, which air-
craft has priority?
• Does the LSO have a defined point in the pat-
tern (the 180, the 90, etc.) at which he must wave-
off or extend MLP traffic if a conflict with other
landing traffic occurs or could occur?
If these questions appear academic or theoretical
read the following near-miss report and imagine it re-
sulted in an accident. These type questions would I
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Well, now. That's nice to know. Would it have
been nicer to be alerted to another aircraft when the
landing clearance came through? Plus a sequence
for landing?
Pilots trust the tower. If no other traffic is reported
there is a tendency to assume none exists. However
wrong this mental relaxation may be, it happens.
And it is disconcerting to catch sight of an aircraft
you were not expecting.
Of course, there is another side to this story. When
we consider non-receipt of a traffic advisory we must
also consider the amounts of energy and attention
and air time going into tower phraseology regarding
wheels-up prevention, noise abatement, obstructions
and construction.
Are we swatting flies with a baseball bat while
forgetting the primary purpose of the tower is
"traffic control?"
Airplanes must continue to operate in the traffic
pattern while tuned to different frequencies—so how
do we go about eliminating future incidents or acci-
dents?
If a small recommendation were to be attempted
from this viewpoint, it might be capsuled: "less chat-
ter, more controlling." Shift the voice communication
emphasis to the subject of traffic advisories, both to
the pilot on GCA and to the pilot on tower/MLP
frequency.
DOCTRINE?
then become very real—the biggest being "What
could be done to prevent a repetition?"
"I entered the landing pattern," said the pilot of a
P-2, "at approximately 0910. After two full stop
landings, several F-8s taxied out for field mirror
landing practice. On the third landing there was no
interference noted.
"After the succeeding takeoff, the tower advised me
to fly the downwind leg at 1500 feet instead of the
usual 1000 feet. When ready to turn base I called
the tower which directed me to extend downwind and
take interval on the F-8 at the 180 degree position.
However, no F-8 was visible at the 180 position but
one was in sight at the 90-degree position.
"The tower replied, 'F-8 behind you. Continue.'
When at the 90-degree position I reported that the
F-8 was still not in sight and received the same re-
sponse as before. Then I received the word 'cleared
to land.'
"While rolling the P-2 out on final approach
(about 400 feet above the ground) an F-8 in a
port turn passed approximately 125 feet below me
and 50 feet to port. He proceeded down the runway,
executing a waveoff.
"The F-8s were switching to LSO frequency prior
to their takeoff; consequently I heard no instructions
transmitted to the F-8 which passed below me."
Obviously, there isn't enough information in this
one-sided report to make an accurate assessment of
the incident but it may be useful for drill purposes.
Was anybody at fault? Probably the major item
was the tower operator's inadequate instruction to
the P-2 pilot—for him to take interval on an aircraft
which was not visible from the P-2 cockpit. Perhaps
the P-2 pilot was too insistent on his right to land
when the situation became confused as to where his
traffic was. Or the LSO could have let the conflict de-
velop to the point where a late waveoff by the F-8
did nothing to improve the closing situation. The
F-8 was the burdened aircraft since it was an over-
taking case—however, the F-8 was at a lower altitude
which sea lawyers can say gave the jet priority to
land.
No matter how you look at it, an accident probably
would have resulted in recommendations to restrict
activities or set up priorities as well as put the LSO
and tower on their toes a little tighter. However,
locking the barn after the horse is gone does nothing
to bring the horse back. Is it better to develop self-
imposed restrictions or wait until they are forced on
us? With so many varieties of aircraft and missions




For project to develop techniques for
night plane guard and rescue has
been completed 1>\ VX-1 at Key West. A rej)ort on
the project will be forwarded to all interested parties.
The following is a discussion of the problem by
LT Paul Frankenberger who recently made a success-
ful helicopter night rescue at sea while operating
from a carrier:
At the time I "experimented" with this night res-
cue and plane guard work I was attached to HS-3
and living the SH-3A (HSS-2).
The need for night rescue techniques became ob-
vious to us almost as Boon as we went to sea, oper-
ationally, with the SH-3A. However, it was force-
fully sent home when an actual night rescue of an
AD pilot was made while at sea in June of this year.
I was rather fortunate in being connected with Un-
successful rescue mission and was able to pro- foi
further work along this line as a result.
I obtained permission from my Squadron Com-
mander and the Air Group Commander to work with
\ some idea- we had for night plane guard.
After experimenting during daylight hours first
we finally had it set up for a "go at it"' at night.
We were the first helicopter in the night marshal
stack. After the carrier had turned to its final re-
covery course, we commenced our approach. The
approach was the normal Tacan/Radar approach up
to one-half mile or when we sighted the carrier
whichever was first. At this point we set in a bear-
ing on our ID-219 that was 135° relative to the
ship's recovery course. We then moved out slightly
to starboard (about 100-200 yards right of the wake)
and when the bearing indicator needle began to
center we commenced our automatic approach.
Our setup for this is 150 feet and 60 knots ground
speed. We set in the ship's recovery speed on the
\
control panel and 80 feet as our base altitude. The
I
approach was commenced by engaging the automa-
tic approach button. The aircraft descended to 80
feet and 20 knots ground speed (this was the ship's
I
recovery speed). Our distance from the ship as in-
dicated on Tacan was l/2 to 1 mile and we moved
ourselves up to our bearing very easily. Comments
from the ship were that this was a good position. So
I
we hovered there maintaining our Tacan position as
necessary with the speed and drift knobs on the
hover control panel. The copilot did this very easily
Ion
command from the pilot. The pilot stayed on
gages while the copilot watched the recovery. We
were in good position to watch launches and re-
! coveries and I suggest that this be given thought to
Ij aid the pilot in just having to keep one position. The
H pilot can go to any area around the carrier very
easily from this position.
Our lights were on bright and our rotating beacons
ON, at the request of the fixed wing pilots. So ap-
parently there was no bother with this.
After the recovery was complete we broke dip in
our normal manner, as we would have in any night
ASW hover, and proceeded ahead until it was safe
and comfortable to turn downwind. At this time a
right turn, standard rate, to the reciprocal of the
recovery course is made. Climb to 600' (or whatever
it is to intercept the mirror) and on signal from
CCA commence a half standard rate turn to final
course, lowering the landing gear and setting the
lights as necessary. Then a normal approach is made
getting the meatball at the normal distance.
That is basically the idea of the night plane guard.
It makes full use of the automatic approach, speed
and altitude controls of the helicopter thus easing the
task of the pilot. However, we felt that the pilot
should stay on the gages and the copilot observe the
recovery. It was very comfortable and entirely feas-
ible. The helicopter can vector easier- to a crash site
than a destroyer can and can do it faster. Also, this
could possibly release a destroyer for duty in the
screen or other tactics.
We experimented also with an approach to a
downed pilot. In this we felt that the actual loca-
tion of the downed pilot was about 75% of the
problem. However, once finding him we could, in
the SH-3A, mark and memorize his position very
easily on the navigator in the plane. Then turning
downwind as we pass over the downed pilot do a
90°
-270°, or standard rate turn, into the wind as
necessary. After going downwind a sufficient time to
cover the automatic approach turn into the wind and
be lined up with the pilot according to the navigator
readout, then commence the automatic approach.
Plan to come to a hover just short of the downed
pilot and then making use of lights to sight the pilot
and the speed set knob move up over the pilot and
effect the rescue.
I feel that full use of all the automatic features
should be made to facilitate the pilot's job and also
to make a safer more stable hover at night.
I do wish to emphasize that full use of any auto-
matic features in the helicopter should be utilized.
Also, these approaches and plane guard positions
should be practiced until they become second nature
to the pilot. I realize that all this work was done with
the SH-3A and the features and equipments in the
plane make any task an easy one and a delight to
perform. •
Age quodagis
THIS narrative is so disgraceful,
so unnecessary and avoidable, but
so typical of what can happen,
even to a Safety Officer, if he is
sufficiently preoccupied and inat-
tentive, that I'm passing it along.
The leader of a flight of four
A-lH6s (AD-6) taxied clear of the
line, and pulled up on the ramp to
await his delinquent wingmen. One
informed him during briefing that
he would be (legitimately) de-
layed. The second had starting
troubles, and the third was con-
stitutionally given to a leisurely
preparation for flight. As a matter
of fact, he briefed in uniform to
avoid the rush and jostle of don-
ning flight gear.
After some 15 minutes, the start-
ing discrepancy was overcome, and
as the leader saw one or more A-IH
straggle out of the line, he gunned
his aircraft around, heading for
the taxiway he had been watching.
Along this taxiway several jets
had been moving as though re-
turning to their line after landing
Oil the runway paralleled by the
taxiway. These moving aircraft
and the wind direction, almost
down the same runway, led thi
hapless leader into the conclusion
that thi-. in fait. was the duty.
He taxied briskly along, inci-
dentally calling Ground Control
for taxi clearance, and receiving
from that agency the duty run-
way, time and altimetef setting
with his clearance. The words off
the ground controller fell on ears|
deafened by preoccupation with
the minutes creeping by the sched-
uled takeoff time, ways and means!
to shorten some parts of the hop,
and malice toward the procra>tinat-
iiiL' wingmen. Tin' trained mind|]
automatically reconciled whateve
it was Ground Control said with
the decision already made in the
matter of duty runways. But here
that old confidence played this di
vision leader false. This failure to
double-check opinions, no matterfl
bon often vindicated, with the!
facts, might have led to very seri-
CUS < on-equences.
Fortunately the jet on final had]
already taken a safe but justifiably!
enraged waveoff because of the]
Spud which briskly taxied across
the true duty runway at the upJ
wind end. About that time the"
brooding flight leader realized his i
grievous error, and crept sharm
fully back, frequently and humbl
requesting the approval of a cold|
and supercilious Ground Control™
ler. This leader learned to hi-JI
chagrin that no matter how ex*
perienced a pilot is, nor how ol
vious a decision of this type migM
seem, that when one is operating ai
aircraft, one does not have time!
for righteous reflections and pk..^
ning timing which does not perl
tain to the operation in progress. II
One must listen carefully and
watch diligently, and as the Latin|j




I WAS recently riding an R4Y
aircraft carrying both passengers
and cargo. Among the cargo were
tool boxes secured with nylon car-
go straps. After touching down,
the props were placed in reverse
pitch and hard braking was ini-
tiated. At this time the tool boxes
slid out from under the securing
straps and came flying forward
along the flight deck. If a wheels-
up landing had been made, I feel
sure all the cargo would have
come flying forward.
The R4Y has areas with net
fronts for storing just such cargo.
There is no excuse for this type
incident. Laxness on the part of
crewmembers in securing cargo
and plane commanders in inspect-
Iing secured cargo could lead to
much more serious consequences.
Night Light?
IT was a beautiful night. The
stars were bright and a field-grade
moon was as pretty as a silver dol-
lar in the sky.
Like all hot pilots fresh out of
the training command, I was anx-
ious to launch on my second
night fam in a Crusader. With
afterburners blazing, the RAG in-
structor and I blasted off into the
night. The hop was routine and
went as briefed—Well, almost as
briefed. We returned to base VFR
and broke for individual touch-
and-go landings. After several
landings I was feeling pretty good
about how well I could handle the
bird. After calling the 180 and
being cleared for another touch-
and-go the tower frequency became
cluttered with some chatter which
I wasn't paying much attention to.
After the landing I was about
to call for downwind when the
tower finally ascertained that an
Air Force T-33 was entering the
break with no navigation lights
and an intermittent radio. I was
instructed to maintain my alti-
tude so the T-33 could break over-
head. I immediately pulled off the
climbing power and began to scan
up and aft, looking for the guy.
I must have begun easing in back-
stick too because seconds later the
aircraft buffeted and one wing
dropped.
After adding 100% my eyes
were glued on the instruments:
200'/min sink rate and the alti-
meter unwinding. I held what I
had for what seemed like an eter-
nity. My bird quit settling at 500'
indicated (field elevation—477')
with 110 knots and 19 or 20 units
angle of attack (13y2 units is op-
timum)
.
To this day I don't know wheth-
er I went over or under a power
line which is one mile or so off
the end of the runway. The tower
said "Four-zero-five, are you ex-
periencing any difficulty?" Silence
—I wasn't able to answer until
arriving at the 180 again when I
called for a full stop.
I learned from this experience
that night work is basically instru-
ment work and that in a tight
situation I'll never hesitate to use
afterburner when it is needed.
Big Foot
DROPPED passenger at the
scheduled stop at NAS enroute in
my Sneeb. Scheduled copilot un-
available, but a passenger was
there for NAS home—a POl air-
crewman with many flight hours
including Beech observer time.
CAVU weather entire route, so
took the POl as observer and de-
parted. Being bighearted and nor-
mally gregarious, put POl in
right seat. Trip uneventful. Had
thoroughly briefed him on emer-
gency procedures and to keep from
touching any knob, switch, lever,
etc. He was a large man and filled
the seat to overflowing.
After landing at destination,
taxied to line. Upon entering the
line, before getting to the pack, the
Sneeb started drifting left, right
brake and, as the left turn became
more pronounced, left engine, had
no effect. Since my taxi speed was
slow I took all power off and the
left turn was stopped after 270
degrees. A fast taxi speed would
have given a groundloop for sure.
No malfunction of any system
could be seen until I noticed the
large feet of the observer slap up
against the brakes. Stretching, he
had inadvertently actuated the left
brake—when he saw the aircraft
was not doing what I wanted,
he'd frozen tight, remembering my
instructions, so as not to interfere
with my controls. Returned to line.






August issue had a reply to a letter
about multi-engine hardhats stating
APH-5 hardhats will be used for all
aircraft.
Our squadron has been using a multi-
engine hard hat, designated S/PH-1,
and many of the pilots are quite
pleased with it. Is the S/PH-1 no long-
er an acceptable protective device, a^
described in NATOPS, and if so what
Instruction Number has cancelled or
restricted its use?
JOHN T. STEELE, LT
ASO PATRON 17
^For the latest word from Bu-
Weps on evaluation of the multi-
engine hardhat (the BPH-1 hel-
met) see the answer to LT R. J.
Prosser's letter next on this page.
The NATOPS Manual outlines
the requirement to wear a pro-
tective helmet. The Section "H"
allowance list specifies the type of
helmet to be worn. In accordance
with the Section "H" Allowance
List the S/PH-1 helmet is not au-
thorized for your squadron.
Very resp'y,
4feJh*^
Survival Equipment in P-3 (P3V)
P-2 (P2V), and P-5 (P5M)
New requirements have been issued
by CNO for wearing parachute har-
nesses, life jackets and helmets in P-3
(P3V), P-2 (P2V) and P-5 ( P5M
)
aircraft. The following is taken from
CNO's letter of I Nov 62:
Parachute Harnesses:
1. To be worn by the pilot and co-
pilot at all times during flight in P-2,
P-5 and P-3 aircraft.
2. To be worn during flight or pre-
fitted and stowed in a readily acces-
sible predesignated standard location
by all other crew members and pas-
sengers of P-2, P-5 and P-3 aircraft.
Parachute harnesses are required to
be worn by all occupants of P-5 air-
craft during overland flight opera-
tions.
Life Jackets:
1. To be worn by the pilot and
copilot at all times during overwater
flight operations in all three types of
aircraft.
2. To be worn by all other occu-
pants during overwater takeoffs and
landings and during other overwater
flight operations below 1000 feet. To
be worn or stowed in a predesignated
standard stowage space during other
overwater flights. This policy is ap-
plicable to all three types of air-
craft.
Protective Helmets:
I. To be worn by all aircraft occu-
pants during takeoff and landing in
P-2, P-5 and P-3 aircraft and to be
worn or accessibly stowed in a pre-
designated standard stowage space
during other flight operations.
Dear Headmouse:
While brow-ing through the Aug. '62
approach I noted a letter and reply
concerning hardhats for us twin fan
types.
\\ ith all due respect for the APH-5
< I have one and used it in patrol air-
craft for over a year) I think the wrong
people were in on the evaluation of the
multi-engine hardhat. I am one of the
fortunate few in this area to own and
use the experimental DH-51-4 < BPH-1 I
patrol hardhat. In two years of constant
use (over 70 hours a month yet) I have
found it far superior to the APH-5.
While not much lighter, it is cooler,
more comfortable I my APH-5 is pro-
perly fitted) and allows for much
easier communications between pilots
and crewmen with or without the aid
of an ICS.
In this area of the world where a 12-
hour hop at low altitude with ambient
air temperature as high as 100°F. is
the normal, an APH-5 is next to im-
possible without a built-in air condi-
tioner. The DH-51-4 is used and sworn
to by those fortunate few who have
them, and in most cases it is used for
the entire flight, regardless of length.
I, for one, would be all in favor of a
re-evaluation of the patrol hardhat.
preferably by the people who will
have to use it, and in the area where
it will be used (all of them). If the
APH-5 edict is to be enforced, I fear
that we patrol types will continue to
have problems in non-compliance with
directives concerning the use of hard-
hats in the multi-engine patrol air-
craft. And this, needless to say, con-
stitutes a safety hazard for those con-
cerned.
R. J. PROSSER, LT
ASO, VP-40
Have you a question? Send it to Headmouse, U.S. Naval Avia-
tion Safety Center, Norfolk 1 1, Virginia. He'll do his best to help.
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Because of your letter and simi-
lar inquiries, the NASC queried
BuWeps on the status of the pro-
tective helmet for patrol plane
I
crewmen. The following answer
was received:
"As a result of Fleet comments
I
concerning the evaluation of the
BPH-1 helmet, this Bureau de-
ferred additional procurement un-
til such time as remedial action
I
could be taken to correct the dis-
crepancies noted. These discrepan-
cies involved comfort, sound atten-
uation, earphone mounting, reten-
Ition and webbing attachment and
adjustment.
"Design modifications are being
I
made to correct the above discre-
pancies and a quantity for flight
evaluation will be procured short-
ly. On completion of successful
B
flight evaluation at the Naval Air
Test Center, revised design data
I will be furnished to the Aviation
Supply Office for procurement of




ComCruDesLant Inst 3505.4 requires
the commanding officers of destroyers,
"forward to ComCruDesLant a copy of
any aircraft accident report statements
submitted by ship's personnel."
This seems a violation of the principle
that AAR statements are for the use of
the accident board only, and it seems
| that it might have an influence on
what statement the ship's personnel
makes.
I feel that the destroyer force has a
necessity to know this information but




The instruction you quote does
not appear to be in conflict with
OpNav 3750.6D. However, copies
of ship's personnel statements
which have been appended to an
AAR should be treated by Com-
CruDesLant in accordance with




Two third class electricians and a
third class structures mech were check-
ing the operation of a Stoof radome in
connection with the operation of the
landing gear. The aircraft was in the
hangar but not on jacks. All three men
noticed that the main mounts had
ground locks on them but no one
checked the nose gear to see if the C-
clamp was in place. One of the elec-
tricians partially actuated the landing
gear handle just enough to close the
electrical circuit to move the radome
although he knew that electrical power
and hydraulic power was being applied
to the aircraft. The nose gear collapsed,
damaging the nose gear wheel well
doors.
Apparently it had been the policy
to actuate the radome in this manner
with the obvious exception that a C-
elamp must have been used in the past,
since this was the first mishap of this
nature that this squadron had.
The policy has now been modified
such that the gear handle will not be
moved while the aircraft is on the deck
unless it is on jacks.
The C-clamp is an added safety pre-
"They alius blow the horn ten times
before they lower the elevator-r-r-r-r!"
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caution but should not be relied upon
to keep landing gear from folding. It's
better practice to move the gear handle
only when the aircraft is supported by
jacks.
ANYMOUSE
Thank you, Anymouse, wher-
ever you are. Cause and reaction
to this accident is typical of many
reports NASC gets. That is, solid
maintenance practices are ignored
by outfits until something drastic
happens to them. Then the
"clamps" go on. People permitting
such "shortcuts" will inevitably
learn that while there is never time
enough to do the job right the
first time—there is always enough




One preflight check on the Martin-
Baker ejection seat in an AF-1E (FJ-
4B) is to insure that the eye on the end
of the small cable (from the secondary
ejection handle) is on top of the eye
on the large cable (from the face cur-
tain), so that if either cable slips loose
from the seat it will be the secondary
firing cable. A perfect example of a
Murphy.
Why not design the two eyes so that
they cannot be installed improperly,
or hasn't M-B heard about Murphy?
ANYMOUSE
The reason for placing the eye
on the end of the small cable on top
of the eye of the large cable is to
give more positive separation of
the alternate firing cable eye from
the seat after ejection. This will
ascertain positive face curtain sep-
aration when initiating ejection
with the face curtain. This is not a
factor when utilizing the alternate
ejection method for ejection as the
alternate ejection handle does not




by LT Benjamin 0. Bibb
/"knee upon a time there was a young lad named
^-^ Muragatroyd Frunch. He was a strange young-
ster in some ways. For instance, he went in for fish-
ing and hunting and other kinds of healthful outdoor
scam instead of shooting pool and arranging his hair
like most red-blooded American boys.
One summer day Murgatroyd trekked far back
into the woods fishing. A thick overcast soon hid
the sun, then he dropped his compass in the crick,
and then with some suddenness he realized that he
was far from home and had not the most muddled
notion in which direction he could find mama's
loving arms. He was, indubitably and totally, L-O-
S-T. He yelled his head off but no one answered
except some talky jaybirds. Then he had a brilliant
thought. May he could make a sig-er-nal!
Forthwith he threw together a magnificent Boy i
Scout type fire and piled great gobs of green wood on II
it. A column of dark smoke rose through the trees.'
Shortly a watcher in a forestry tower spotted the
smoke and naturally thought a scary old forest fire was II




Being hereby the tale of how our hero did find himself beset by difficulties; how he did
gravely bethink himself and perceive an alleviation; how through perverse fate and sheer
sagacity he did make a complete disorder of the entire circumstance; and how he did en-
counter the means to partially redeem himself through pluck, perseverance, luck and a
modicum of study.
FRUNCH (IFF) SIF SCANDAL
soon (1) found Murgatroyd, (2) put out the fire,
and (3) placed Murgy on report for starting that fire
in the woods during forest fire season.
The basic objective, however, was accomplished.
Murgatroyd Frunch was again enfolded in mama's
loving arms.
Time passed. Murgatroyd Frunch was already in-
telligent, handsome, witty, strong, courageous
—
even clean, reverent, and obedient—and now he was
of age. Since the Presidency was filled at the moment,
as a matter of course he became a Naval Aviator.
More time passed, Murgatroyd became an excellent
Naval Aviator. With experience, yet. But one day he
found himself in a similar situation as in his boy-
hood. He was L-O-S-T again. This time, though, in-
stead of being under the trees under an overcast
he was over the trees over an overcast, straddling a
Mach iy2 horizontal smokestack. His navaids had be-
come catatonic. He repeated his first experience; he
first tried yelling for help. He keyed his microphone.
"( )," said his transmitter.
" ? ," thought Murgy. He tried again.
"( )," repeated his transmitter with the
same inflection.
"!**!?^# & !*#%!*^!," thought Murgatroyd.
Radio kaput, too.
Murgatroyd Frunch cast about in his brilliant
type mind. A sig-er-nal, that's what he needed, again!
Starting a fire, for several reasons, did not seem to
be the answer this time, however. Then a thought
struck him.
"
Identification, Friend or Foe, with Selective Iden-
tification Feature PLACED IN EMERGENCY POSI-
TION!" he roared at his innocent and astonished
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oxygen mask in vigorous and rounded terms. No
sooner articulated than activated.
He placed his Mark X IFF (SIF) Master Control
on EMERGENCY, set up a brisk left triangle flight
path, and waited for an interceptor to lead him home.
He was still waiting when his smokestack ceased
breathing without so much as a by-your-leave-sir. He
then got himself a running rocket start and terminated
his trip vertically in a webbing seat under a most
fragile looking nylon descent device. Meanwhile 1100
kilosimoleons was burying itself in forever unusable
condition in the complaining ground below. Easy
come, easy blow. It was enough to make one cry,
and later thousands of taxpayers did so without re-
servations. Their moans could be heard all the way
to Washington.
Still Murgatroyd Frunch was far. far from mama's
loving arms. Basic objective not accomplished.
What hoppinged? Why does everyone who once
smiled on and petted Murgatroyd Frunch, popular
young Naval Aviator, now snarl at him and try to
push him down the nearest stairs?
Basically because Murgatroyd, smart and hand-
some though he was, was also INATTENTIVE and
MISINFORMED! He did not know that IFF (SIF)
EMERGENCY transmits only on Mode 1, and that
Air Traffic Control radars are normally controlling
aircraft only on Mode 3. Therefore, even if dozens
of Air Traffic Control radars were in his vicinity,
they would not be seeing his EMERGENCY IFF
code. He should have also placed his Mode 3 on Code
77. Then he would have been seen, intercepted, and
enfolded in mama's loving arms, in that order, and
everyone would still be beaming at him instead of
barking at him.
Now Mr. Frunch was neither the first pilot nor
will he be the last to be caught with his G-suit down
by not knowing quite enough about IFF in general
and IFF with Selective Identification Feature in
particular. No one expects the pilot to have first-
name speaking acquaintance with each pulse emitted
by IFF, but the more he knows of the general operat-
ing whys-and-wherefores of the gear the less likely
be is to find himself in an unexplainable situation
that could have originally been resolved by correct
use of IFF. So-o-o. let's take an overall look at the
two types of IFF now in use. Pa) alt cation, Frunch!
IFF. of course, stands for Identification, Friend or
Foe. It was originally meant for identification pur-
poses alone; that is. as an addition to a radar target
that would state to a radar operator in visual terms,
This target is friendly." EMERGENCY would furth-
er state. "'This friendly target is in trouble." IFF had
to be associated with a radar set to make its visual
display. It is therefore considered as a secondary
radar as opposed to the primary radar with which it
is associated.
A primary radar bounces an electronic emission
from an object and receives the reflected return, then
converts this electronic echo to video and displays
it on the face of a radar scope. The secondary radar
—
IFF—transmits an electronic emission which is re-
ceived by a "transponder' aboard the target aircraft.
The transponder then transmits one- or more elec-
tronic pulses in return which are received by the
secondary radar system, fed into the primary radar
display system, and shown on the face of the radar
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scope as a video signal in conjunction with the pri-
mary radar target. The transmitter and receiver sys-
tem of the secondary radar is called the 'interrogator-
responser,' or I/R.
The interrogator, as the name implies, transmits the
challenging emission, and the responser receives,
identifies and feeds into the primary radar display
system the returned pulse (s) from the aircraft trans-
ponder. Since the secondary radar deals with a trans-
mitted reply instead of the echoed reply of primary
radar, it stands to reason that the secondary radar
system will receive a signal in some cases when the
primary radar is not receiving a return. Sometimes,
then, IFF returns will be received when the primary
target cannot be seen because it is too far away, or
too small, or over the radar horizon. This 'IFF only'
return may still be vectored and controlled within
limitations.
The basic Mark X IFF system is relatively simple
in operation. (Except to a person like the author, who
firmly believes that everything that happens after
pushing the button on a black box comes under the
heading of pure magic!) The radar operator has
three different pulse signals to send out as an interro-
gation, or challenge. The challenge signal is a double-
pulsed signal; that is, two pulses sent out on the
same frequency with a set time interval in micro-
seconds between them. The three different signals
are distinguished by different time intervals between
the pulses. The three signals are called Modes, and
are numbered as Mode 1, Mode 2, and Mode 3.
In the aircraft, the pilot operates his transponder
through a Master Control box. In order to answer
a challenge, the Master Control must be switched
from OFF to either LOW, NORMAL, or EMERGEN-
!CY. In other words, the transponder is not acti-
vated until one of these positions is selected. (LOW
I
and NORMAL actually refer to the power output of
the transmitted signal; EMERGENCY will be dis-
cussed further below.) There are switches on the Mas-
ter Control box that activate Mode 2 and Mode 3.
\
Note that there is no switch to activate Mode 1, for
Mode 1 is always activated in basic Mark X IFF
when the transponder is operating in LOW or NOR-
MAL positions. The transponder sends out a single-
pulsed signal as a Mode 1 answer, displayed on the
radar scope as a single video line, or slash. The Mode
2 response is two pulses and is displayed as two slash-
es. The Mode 3 response is again a single pulse and is
again displayed as a single slash.
Since all Mark X transponder reply on Mode 1,
the radar operator whose control is set on Mode 1 sees
as a single slash the IFF returns of all replying tar-
gets within range. When he switches his control to
Mode 2 challenge, however, he will see only the
IFF returns of transponders set on Mode 2. Similarly,
when he switches to Mode 3 he will only see the re-
turns of transponders set on Mode 3. Remember,
however, that when the radar operator goes back to
Mode 1 he will see returns from all Mark X trans-
ponders but will not be able to tell whether they are
also on Modes 2 or 3 or not.
One of the most important things to remember
about basic Mark X IFF is the EMERGENCY return.
When the pilot switches his Master Control to EMER-
GENCY the EMERGENCY return is transmitted on
all modes and therefore the video signal will be dis-
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played on radars set for any mode. The EMER-
GENCY return is four slashes, and is highly distinc-
tive and eye-catching. In other words, had Murga-
troyd Frunch's trouble occurred when only basic
Mark X IFF was in operation, his procedure would
have been correct and he would still be happy-go-
lucky and fair-haired. Woe betide him. though, this
is not true with the addition of Selective Identification.
as we. shall see.
The transponder Master Control switch has an
OFF position and a STANDBY (power on but not
transmitting! position in addition to LOW, NOR-
MAL, and EMERGENCY. Further, in addition to the
two switches for Mode 2 and Mode 3, there is a
three-position switch marked 'I I' OUT—MIC.
This is a special use position for the III', originally
designed for security purposes but now used mostl)
for identification purposes or to reduce IFF returns.
When this switch is placed in I P I Identification of
Position) position. Mode 2 interrogations an- an-
swered. The I P switch is spring loaded and must be
held on. The Mode 2 switch should not /<«• on when
I/P is being used. When this switch is positioned to
MIC, Mode 2 interrogations air again answered, but
only when the pilot's microphone button i- depressed.
(OFT on all the enumerated switches corresponds
to OFF.)
Now. in analagous terms, let us see what we can
extract from an unknown aircraft target. Suppose you
find yourself in a dark field one night. You suspect
that someone else is in the field, abo. You call out,
*Ts there anyone out there?" A voice answers, "Yes".
You continue to question. "Where are you. in which
direction are you traveling, and how fast?" The voice
answers, "I am in the northwest corner of the field
walking southward at a slow; pad'.'" This would be
the information primary radar would give you on
an aircraft target, but this is not enough information
for your purposes. Now you ask, "Are you a member
of the Crocodile Lodge?", and the voice answers,
"Yes." This would be the information basic Mark
X IFF would give you. This still is not enough in-
formation for your purposes. Now you ask, "If you
are a Crocodile, give me your Lodge name and the
password that authorizes you to be here tonight." The
voice answers, "My Lodge name is Shrimpface and
the password for this walk tonight is geet reet." This
would be the additional information Mark X IFF
(SIF) would give you.
As this analogy would indicate, the addition of
Selective Identification Feature to Mark X IFF makes
it no longer simple. It is a much more sophisticated
but much more useful piece of equipment than the
basic IFF.
Mark X IFF with it^ three modes did not provide
enough individual identification of aircraft. It wa-
found that the needs of both military and civil avia-
tion required a fast and compatible means of elec-
tronically identifying aircraft for both air traffic
control and security purposes. Therefore, the three
modes in the IFF equipment were provided means
to make separate and distinct displays within the
modes. This was done b) coding the IFF replies The
interrogator-responser at the radar location was pro-
vided with a decoder, and the transponder was pro-
voided with a coding control allowing the setting of
various codes in Mode 1 and Mode 3 (Mode 2 is also
coded, bul the pilot cannot set the codes from the
cockpit. Thej are preset on the ground.) The Master
Mark X IFF (SIF) is designed to help
the pilot through helping the controller.
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Control box of the basic IFF remains unchanged. The
coding control box is simply an addition to it.
The SIF-equipped transponder replies to challenges
with several pulses instead of the one or two in
Mark X IFF. (The double-pulsed challenges remain
the same.) The pulses may be up to eight in number.
The first and last pulses are called "bracket" or tim-
ing pulses, and are not, in effect, a part of the coding
since they are transmitted with all codes. Within the
bracket pulses there is time/space for six 'informa-
tion pulses' to be transmitted at set intervals. These
pulses are given a numerical value. The entire 'code
train' would be ( 1 2 4 1 2 4 ) . The first three infor-
mation pulses are grouped to give the value of the
first code number, and the second three are similarly
grouped to give the value of the second code number.
As an example, let us say that all three information
pulses in the first grouping are transmitted by the
transponder. The values of the three pulses are added
to give the first code number, and 1 plus 2 plus 4
equal 7. In the second grouping of three information
pulses, only the pulses valued at 1 and 2 are trans-
mitted, with the pulse valued at 4 being left out.
Again, 1 plus 2 equals 3, so the second digit of the
code number is 3. Therefore the code transmitted
was 73. In a simplified schematic, the code train
would look like this— ( / / / / / )
.
Now that you know the numerical value of the
pulses, let's show a few examples of coded responses
using slant signs to indicate pulses transmitted but
not showing their value. See how many you can de-
code correctly.
( / / / ) Code 51
(//////) Code 77
( / / ) Code 60
( / ) Code 02
You will have noted by now that neither the first nor
last digit of the codes can go higher than 7.
The coding control box attached to the Master
Control in the cockpit has two SIF coding dials with
rotatable inner and outer rings imprinted with num-
bers. The left coding dial is for Mode 1 and the right
for Mode 3. The outer rings set the first number of
the code and the inner rings set the second number.
Thus, 6 on the outer ring rotated to a position match-
ing the pointer-indicator, and on the inner ring
rotated to the same position, would select 60 as a code.
If you were using Mode 1 Code 60 in regular opera-
tions, then, you would have your IFF Master Control
set on NORMAL, Modes 2 and 3 switches on OUT,
and the Mode 1 coding set as above. If you were told
to use Mode 3 Code 42, you would set the master to
NORMAL. Mode 2 switch to OUT, Mode 3 switch ON.
and the Mode 3 (right-hand) coding dials to outer
ring 4 and inner ring 2. Unless otherwise advised,
Mode 1 should be left on 00 for normal air traffic
control purposes.
The coding dials for Mode 3 have the numbers
through 7 on both the outer and inner rings. This
gives a total of 64 codes available in Mode 3. How-
ever, in Mode 1 the outer ring has through 7 but
the inner ring only through 3. The last digit of a
Mode 1 code will never exceed 3. This gives 32 codes
for Mode 1. (In other words, the final information
pulse, value 4, is never transmitted in Mode 1 cod-
ing-)
As we have already noted, SIF EMERGENCY
does not operate the same as does basic Mark X
EMERGENCY replies on all modes. SIF EMER-
GENCY replies only on Mode 1. With SIF, when the
pilot selects EMERGENCY position on his Master
Control, the transponder replies to Mode 1 challenges
by sending four complete code trains in the code
set on the transponder. This return showing on the
face of a radar scope is very distinctive, being four
times as long as the normal code train return. But
again remember that only GCI sites will normally
be searching on Mode 1. Air Traffic Control Centers,
Approach Controls, and other air traffic control agen-
cies will usually only be on Mode 3. The nearest
code in Mode 3 to regular EMERGENCY is the code
with the fullest code train. What is this? Code 77, of
course. Hence it follows that Code 77 was selected as
the Mode 3 EMERGENCY. Hence again, in order to
alert every possible radar source, the pilot using IFF/
SIF must place his Master Control on EMERGENCY,
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place his Mode 3 switch ON, and select Code 77
on his Mode 3 coding dial.
In addition to the big difference in EMERGENCY
use with the basic Mark and the Mark X IFF(SIF),
there is another important difference in the two. In
SIF the I/P function is on Mode 1 instead of Mode 2.
(Some types of SIF may also transmit I/P on Mode
3.) In Mark X the I/P video return looks the same
as regular Mode 2 return. In SIF operation, the I/P
position replies with two code trains in the code set
on the transponder. This return is displayed on the
radar during the time the I/P switch is held on and
continues for thirty seconds after it is released. MIC
position performs the same whenever the microphone
button is depressed.
We have not discussed Mode 2 very much in the
SIF equipment. This is mainly because Mode 2 is
used for Air Defense Command purposes in the
United States. It is of interest to note, though, that
although most Mode 2 installations make use of six
information pulses as do the other modes, there are
provisions for installing 12 information pulses. These
12 pulses will have the same numerical value as the
original six (1 2 4 etc.) with the exception that
there will be four groupings of three pulses each in-
stead of the two groupings now used. This will make
up a four digit code with a total of 4096 codes pos-
sible in Mode 2.
As we already know, Mode 3 is used for Air Traf-
fic Control (plus other use as noted below), and
Mode 1 is the General Identification mode.
All military pilots are doubtless acquainted with
the terminology used for IFF by controllers, so we
will not go into these. However, you may hear at times
a different terminology used by FAA controllers. The
civil aircraft system corresponding to military IFF
is called Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System
lATCRBS). In voice phraseology, it is referred to
as 'beacon'. The ATCRBS modes are lettered instead
of numbered. Thus ATCRBS Mode A corresponds
to military Mode 3. (In written terms, the FAA
usually refers to the Air Traffic Control mode as Mode
A/3.) In phraseology again, the FAA may use, "Re-
ply Mode 3 code thus-and-so," corresponding to
"Squawk Mode 3 code thus-and-so." Similarly, Tdent'
means the same as 'I/P' or 'flash'. Also, other services
sometimes refer to EMERGENCY as Mode 4. It is
expected that these differences in terminology and
phraseology will be resolved to a single standard
sometime in the future.
Certain codes in Mode 3 are set aside for special
usage. For instance, several codes are reserved for
NORAD use. At present, Code 02 is used for IFR
flight at an assigned flight level when operating above
Flight Level 240; similarly, Code 62 is used for VFR
or VFR-on-top flight above Flight Level 240. (These
codes may be changed in the future and pilots should
keep informed through Flight Information Publica-
tions.) Some units or areas have certain codes re-
served for use when Distinguished Visitors are
aboard the aircraft.
The major assignment of Mode 3 codes, however,
are for specific air traffic terminal areas. A terminal
area may have as many as three codes assigned for
aircraft operating from each field within its control
area—a pick-up code, a feeder code, and a departure
code. The pick-up code is used for identification pur-
poses. The feeder code is used for the approach, but
the pick-up and feeder codes may overlap in use to
some degree. The departure code is used until the
departing aircraft leaves the terminal area or is
ordered to shift to enroute code.
5oo.UWl ktt^ o^mvtwu^Ht \ u^ fj2aa/m^A(«At(WWe~E"ER<^ eu4 loit/dS y^X rfW&, e»JU3.
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Mark X IFF(SIF) can be seen to have a myriad of
uses. The big picture to remember is that it is de-
signed to help the pilot, through helping the con-
troller. Here are a few additional tips that will help
the controller, also:
• Leave your Master Control on STANDBY while
on the ground.
• Keep your Master Control on LOW while within
ten miles of a terminal controlling agency. Nor-
mal power will probably 'ring' the radar scope.
• Shift immediately and positively to the re-
quired code when requested.
• Do not use an unassigned code under any cir-
cumstances.
• Once you have activated EMERGENCY IFF for
a legitimate reason, leave it on until advised to
shut it off by an authorized controlling or assist-
ing agency.
Any questions. Murgalroyd Frunch? rf not. ihen
remain after school and write the following sentence
500 times; "When I have an emergency, I will place
my Master Control on EMERGENCY and will also
squawk Mode 3 Code 77." Except for your con-
science, your sin of omission will then be expiated.
Maybe. Class dismissed.
Oops—one moment, please. There was the time
when an inexperienced controller asked a pilot to
"squawk Mode 3 Code so-and-so". The pilot replied,
"My parrot is sick." The controller immediately an-
swered, "That's nothing. My Chihuahua is dead! Do
what I told you!" 1
1 Which is from pretty far out on the cob, but tell
me—do you know any really funny stories about
IFF? •
Pilot JHoccUqa, 2>eaiced
The following describes current locator de-
vices carried by pilots. More detailed informa-
tion can be found in "Where Am I?", Sept.,
1961. approach, and in Personal/Survival
































when parachute 1000 cycle
is deployed Modulated
Tone CW
The PRC-17 is the Navy's oldest unit. It is be-
ing phased out by the PRC-32 which has no
automatic actuation. The PRT-3 can be used in
conjunction with the PRC-32. The PRC-49 is a
transistorized version of the PRC-32 and has
the beacon capabilities of the PRT-3.
Tapes are available, on request, from the
Naval Aviation Safety Center, to those activities
desiring audio presentations of the three differ-
ent tone modulations used in the various equip-
ments. Some evaluation work has been done by
fleet units wherein certain shipboard receiving
equipment installations have been proposed in
order to give rescue vessels an immediate ADF
bearing acquisition on airmen, both during
parachute descent and when on the surface. One
such proposal suggested using the following
equipments for both locating pilots' beacons
and normal CIC work:
• TheAN/URD—2,—2A (VHF), AN/URD-
4 (UHF).
• The AN/ARA-25 which can be adapted
to the AN/GRC-27. (This appears fea-
sible since the AN/GRC-27 has a DF
switch position and the AN/ARA-25 is
used on the aircraft version of the AN/
GRC-27. The power supply of the AN/
GRC-27 should handle the AN/ARA-25.
The 28 VDC two-ampere motor could be
changed to a 110 VAC motor.)
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nA<M GETTING
Here's what a squadron with access to suitable area can do
to improve the survival conditioning of its crewmembers.
II
By J. F. Holgate, J02
BACK HOME
Survival training is almost useless to an aviator
flying an aircraft in the best of condition. It is
when his plane acts up or quits altogether, from
:
either mechanical or combat causes, that training
of this nature is a dire necessity. In simple words,
aircraft are more easily replaced than pilots.
Being staunch believers in these loosely stated
axioms, Attack Squadron 43, based at NAS Oceana,
has made a point of trying to offer the fleet the best
trained pilots in the Navy.
In order to accomplish this task they have initiated
a special training program with the squadron to ap-
proach survival instruction from the most interesting
and beneficial angle. This training is for both re-
placement and instructor pilots and as such encom-
i passes all squadron pilots at one time or another.
The course, under the guidance of LT C. E.
I
Garber and R. A. Bower, PR3, is not meant to re-
place the regular service survival schools but rather
to augment them. Consequently, it serves as an ef-
Ifective refresher for those who have already at-
tended the regular schools and also as a basic indoc-
trination course for those who have not.
The instructions begin, with the cooperation of
LT C. E. Garber gives the opening lecture on the necessity
of survival training to a group of Navy pilots at Camp A. P.
Hill, Virginia.
the U. S. Army, at Camp A. P. Hill in Virginia. It
is in this wooded area that a class, ranging from 10
to 12 men, depending on the squadron's CarQual
schedule, is introduced to the probability of their
being in a survival situation. A lecture is given
on the necessity of this kind of training. From this
subject LT Garber goes right into realistic lectures
and demonstrations on Food and Water Procurement,
Improvisations, Day and Night Navigation (cross-
country), Evasion Techniques, Compass Reading,
Survival Fires and Appropriate Shelters.
During these lectures, a personal survival kit in
addition to the Navy's kit is discussed which might
include such items as a piece of surgical tubing, ex-
tra shroud line, fishing gear, a small pocket knife
with the little blade honed to razor sharpness, an
extra pair of socks, a small pair of pliers and some
APCs and vitamins.
The improvisation lecture vividly points out that
these things could be of the utmost importance if a
pilot was unable for any reason to take his seat pan
with him after a forced landing or a ditching. In
such a situation he would have only the gear he car-
ried on his person with which to hope to survive.
But, through the lecture it is proved that this gear
can be sufficient if the pilot is aware of the varied
uses of these bare essentials. For instance, if he knew
that his torso harness contains nearly 17 ft. of con-
tinuous webbing, even mukluk shoes could be made
from it. His anti-G suit also has several uses such as
being excellent flotation gear for crossing streams or
rivers and its ability to hold approximately two gal-
lons of water. Of course there are yards and yards
of thread in this suit and the fasteners could easily
be made into fish hooks for improvised food pro-
curement gear. So, as the lecture goes, with a little
pre-planning almost anything is possible.
After this initial briefing is completed, each man
is issued an improvised seat pan which includes a
compass, whistle and map of the area, a poncho, a
snake bite kit, a water bag, purification tablets and
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one tin of arctic rations. These rations are shared
by two men who are designated as a team and are
referred to by a team number from this time until
the completion of the entire problem. Once the gear
is inventoried the teams are taken on a day-naviga-
tion cross-country trip and each team is given a
rhance to experience this type of navigation by taking
the lead for a period. Upon arrival at the destina-
tion the teams are split up for the rest of the problem
and they go their separate ways to set up shelters
in areas previously designated on each individual
team's map.
They are given a couple hours of rest and then are
taken by bus to a spot some distance from their
shelters where an instructor accompanies them part
way on a night-navigation problem. At this time they
are introduced to the "walking stick." a stick cut
from wood strong enough to support each man's
weight and approximately three inches higher than
the individual's eye level. This stick is held before
the evadee as he traverses strange wooded country
at night and acts as an effective warning of slopes,
ditches, cliffs, holes, logs barring the way and un-
sturdy ground. It is also excellent protection for the
eyes from brush, limbs. . . .
After each team has had a chance to get a taste
of night travel and navigation through wooded
country by leading the class for a short while, the
instructor stops the group and. in the dark, .-hows
them the effectiveness of small amounts of camou-
flage. They are then quickly briefed on the general
location of the "aggressors" (squadron personnel who
help to make the problem as realistic as possible and
act as a safety measure). Students are warned to
stay clear of broken trails, roads and. whenever pos-
sible, open areas where the aggressors may be wait-
ing. After a review of tin- safety signals, three whistle
blasts at one-minute intervals, to be used in case
help i- needed, the) are sent on their way from differ-
ent area> with instructions to evade the "enemy" and
proceed to the "free area" where the) are to sign in
at a prescribed time and thru proceed to their -bel-
ters, all the while remaining concealed and undiscov-
ered.
The second da\ of the problem i- also an escape
and evasion endeavor for the team-. They then have
to pnxeed to a designated ana marked on their
maps by each team'- number. At this poinl the) will
find a piece of parachute with their team number on
it in grea-e pencil. This i- a simulated partisan con-
tact. From here the) proceed t<> a rendezvous area
where each team meets with the instructor vehicle al
a prescribed time and place and turn- over the
marked piece of parachute a- proof that the contact
was made. The team- then proceed cross-country, at
night, to the new "'free area" and sign in within a
designated time limit before returning to their shel-
ter- for the- remainder <>f the- night.
\i 0600 Sunda) all the team- are picked up and
taken to an A rim me— hall for breakfast and then
it"- back to Oceana for a critique of the whole exer-
cise.
The espirit de corps and seriousness with which
the pilots participate in the problem make it realis-
tic and ver) profitable for them a- well as the in-
structors.
The following are some of the questions and an-
swers from a typical problem—and critique:
Were the lectures presented well?
The material presented was worthwhile and to the
point. Presenting lecturc-s in the field where demon-
strations can be performed is a very effective way of
R. A. Brower, PR3. shows what can be done with the 17
feet of webbing in the torso harness during the improvisation
lecture.
Instructor shows students how to get around in the dark
during the night navigation course.
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A type of improvised summer "home," made from a para-
chute—an example of what can be done, with a little ingenuity.
gretting across the noteworthy points.
Do you think anything could be added or eliminated?
Perhaps there could be more briefs on terrain al-
though I understand that much of this type of in-
formation was left out purposely in order to simulate
realism.
It might be a good idea for the riggers to compile
a personal survival kit such as was discussed for use
during the lectures.
In the limited time available I feel that everything
mentioned was educational and none of it should
be eliminated.
Did you learn anything new in survival techniques?
Yes, night navigation is a problem previously not
encountered.
I feel that I learned a great deal concerning the
management of my personal gear.
The night navigation was a very important aspect
Student makes himself a walking stick, a stick cut from wood
trong enough to support a man's weight.
to add to survival and evasion tactics.
I learned quite a few rules-of-thumb on edibility of
plants, etc.
If I had been told prior to this problem that I
could walk through anything on the blackest of
nights with less than 1 inch visibility, I would have
laughed heartily.
This was the most instructive survival training 1
have ever experienced.
Was the field problem important? If so what did you
learn.
It was very worthwhile and I learned one very im-
portant fact; how not to dress on normal flights.
Yes, I learned a great deal about night navigation
and the management of my personal gear such as
food and water.
This was a very important problem and I learned
very important facts on evasion and camouflage.
Yes, very worthwhile. I learned the usefulness of
the walking stick and also gained confidence in eva-
sion tactics.
Was the safety of health and person adequate in the
field?
The general opinion of all concerned was that the
safety aspect was more than adequate and that in-
structors knew at all times the approximate area in
which the students were traveling. Consequently, they
knew that help was readily available if it was needed.
The critiques bring out the fact that the most
important aspect of the problem is the learning of the
basics of escape and evasion and night navigation.
This of course is shared with a by-product called in-
dividual discovery.
This course is given on an average of once every
6 to 8 weeks and since its beginning, approximately
120 pilots have gone through it and are now in the
fleet.
All in all the course not only instructs the in-
dividuals in survival techniques, but also instills in
them a great deal of self-confidence.
This is one case where the instructor feels that if
his students hate and damn him, then he has ac-
complished his mission; the retention of training
through vivid memory.
notes from your flight surgeon
THE two-plane T2V flight was
a VFR high altitude navigation
flight, estimated time enroute to
destination, 1.7 hours. In the lead
plane were a Lt pilot and a non-
pilot NAO student. Four to 10
miles separation of the two air-
craft was planned.
After about 1.5 hours from
launch the NAO student noticed
the aircraft was drifting off course.
He called the Lt and asked him
what they were doing. There was
no answer. The NAO could see
the pilot was slumped over and as-
sumed he was having oxygen dif-
ficulties. He called him and told
him to go on 100% oxygen. There
was no response. At 42,000' the
NAO assumed control and called
the pilot of the second aircraft
for instructions. Fortunately the
NAO had some previous T2V
flight instruction. The pilot of the
second plane instructed him to
continue flying the aircraft on
present course. All efforts to
arouse the unconscious pilot were
unsuccessful.
Near destination they orbited
and made a gradual descent with
the second pilot coaching the NAO
down. The field was notified of
the difficulty and they were cleared
to land. Descending through 10,-
000' the pilot began to stir and
regain consciousness and immedi-
ately began to fight for control of
the aircraft. The pilot and NAO
fought for control to about 5000',
where the pilot became more re-
sponsive, assumed control of the
plane and landed normally except
for a low slow 90° position. They
had 200 to 300 lbs. of fuel re-
maining. (The pilot said later he
was forced to exert himself to the
utmost in order to function at all.)
Examined by a flight surgeon
after landing, he was found to be
suffering no ill effects.
The pilot's oxygen mask was
checked and found to have a pin
hole in one of the inlet valvo.
I In exhalation valve was sticking
and there was dust and debris in
the exhalation port. When the in-
let and exhalation valves were re-
placed, the mask operated proper-
ly. At intervals of one-half to one
hour after takeoff, the pilot had
removed his oxygen mask three
times for periods of less than one
minute to drink juice and milk,
and to eat a sandwich and a boiled
egg. Cabin altitude was 19,000'.
Defroster, normal; heat moderate-
ly warm. After eating, he immedi-
ately replaced the mask at a com-
fortable level of tightness. The
flow indicator functioned both on
"normal" and on 100% oxygen.
On several occasions the pilot
placed the selector in 100% and
"was satisfied" that the regulator
and his personal equipment were
operating satisfactorily.
Oxygen masks should be in-
spected and cleaned thoroughly as
frequently as required by service
conditions. Procedures are out-




WHILE attempting to connect
a towbar attached to a HUP-2 on-
to the tow tractor, the brake rider
was holding the bar with his left
hand and the pin with his right.
The towman started to back the
tow tractor, which reacted slowly.
He added foot throttle and the
tractor began moving rapidly
rearward. As he braked, his foot
slipped off the pedal and onto the
accelerator. The tractor continued
into the aircraft and pinned the
brakerider's leg against the air-
craft.
Investigators concluded that the
accident was caused by the tow-
man's failure to keep the vehicle
under constant control. The brake-
rider was responsible for his own
injury by standing between the
aircraft and the backing tow trac-
tor. The towman, in overall charge
of the operation, should have or-
dered the brakerider to take up a
position where he would avoid in-
jury, the report stated.
Inflate Vests
IT IS recommended that people
again be reminded of how im-
portant it is to inflate their life
i vests. The possibility of the sur-
I vivor being struck or going into
I shock, or rescue being delayed is
, too great not to inflate the mae
1 west.
One man in this helicopter ac-
I
cident performed above average
1
during the accident until the point
of inflating the mae west. The
'fact that he also got into the res-
cue sling backwards even after his
I considerable training and work in
I rescue type operations indicates
we must overlearn safety pro-




AFTER the accident an injured
F3H pilot, who landed wheels-up
on the carrier because of a gear
malfunction, had some suggestions
on flight deck rescue:
"These points are not meant to
be a criticism in any way," he
stated, "but are merely to empha-
size the need for more and better
training using the actual aircraft
and equipment on board.
"First, the face curtain pin was
not inserted before they began
unstrapping me and removing my
equipment. It took quite a bit of
time and effort to finally get this
point across to the people involved
and it kept me pretty concerned
for awhile.
"Secondly, there were too many-
people around the cockpit and this
confused the issue quite a bit. One
or two men to do the work
—
pre-
ferably a pilot if one is available,
along with the flight surgeon and
a crash and salvage man—is all
that would ever be needed until
the time comes to actually pick
the survivor up.
"This is a hard thing to say
when I know that those people
were all there out of concern for
the pilot; but because of the con-
fusion that existed, attempts were
made to lift me up while my lower
torso fittings were still connected.
The rest of the operation went real
well and I was lifted out like I was
a crate of eggs, which made me
quite happy to say the least."
No Life Vest
THE copilot of a UF-1 which
ditched was not wearing a life
vest. He exited via the forward
starboard escape hatch which the
plane captain had opened. Climb-
ing forward onto the nose of the
aircraft, he dove off and swam
back under water until he could
surface clear of the still-turning
propellers. A crewman in the air-
craft threw him a life vest which
he put on. Ten minutes later he
was in a life raft and in another
10 minutes, was taken aboard a
crash boat.
OpNavInst 3710.7A states that
life vests shall be worn during all
seaplane operations.
Knotted Line
WHEN a plane guard helicopter
ditched because of engine trouble,
the surviving crewman was res-
cued by destroyer. As the ship
came alongside the survivor's in-
flated life raft, destroyer person-
nel threw the survivor a number
of shot lines. He caught one and
was pulled to the ship. A larger
line was thrown down to him and
he was hauled up the side until
his hands began to slip and he
fell back into the water.
He shouted for someone to tie
a knot in the line . . . this was
done and he was successfully
hoisted aboard.
This man could have been lost.
A sling would have greatly facili-
tated this rescue.
Flight Deck Accident
ON AN overcast dark night a
plane captain went aft on the
starboard side of an AD-6 which
had just landed. He was apparent-
ly checking for tie-downs. In the
meantime another AD-6 had
landed and was spotted about one
foot behind the first plane. The
engine was shut off. The plane
captain, flashlight in hand, ducked
beneath the starboard horizontal
stabilizer and straightened up in-
to the still-moving propeller blade.
The blow knocked him to the





FOD is still "Enemy No. I" to the jet engine. It ranks also as "Public Enemy
No. I" to you and me. It takes a high toll of lives, extra work and our dol-
lars. FOD can be arrested but it takes real effort on the part of all hands
—
Here's a rundown on what's happening and how it can be prevented.
r 1 \irbojet engines are still suffering foreign object
-*- damage (FOD), they are still being rejected to
overhaul, and they are still being scrapped.
What are foreign objects? Anything which is not
fastened down and can find its way through the en-
gine inlet into the compressor qualifies. This covers
a lot of territory: the pencil or security badge in your
shirt pocket, the carelessly dropped pieces of lock
wire, nuts, bolts, washers, wrenches, screwdrivers,
birds, gravel, pieces of runway, rags
—
you name it
and it's a foreign object if it gets in the compressor
or turbine wheel.
Damage Potential
Let's look at a hypothetical engine for a second.
This engine has a first stage compressor wheel three
feet in diameter, blade tip to blade tip. The blades
are six inches long. When this wheel is rotated at
8000 rpm, the linear velocity of any point on the
blade will range between about 718 to 864 miles
per hour.
Imagine what happens when a nut, a bolt, or any
of the other foreign objects hits one of these blades.
Also don't forget that the foreign object is usually
moving and the effect is even greater. You've seen
automobiles hit head-on at speeds much less than
those mentioned and you should readily understand
what happens to a compressor when foreign objects
make contact with compressor blades.
Now let's take a look at the picture of the effects
of FOD Navywide.
Effect of Damage
During an 18-month period, from October 1960
through March 1962, 749 of 5036 jet engines, or
14.8% were damaged by ingestion of foreign ob-
jects. This does not include engines removed from
service for high time, or engines revealing basic
type failures or discrepancies at engine disassembly.
Shipboard operation also has its share. Review of
the FUR system reports during the six-month period
ending May 1962, revealed 16.2% of the engines
were damaged during shipboard operations. Ship
board operations were involved in 14.7% of the total
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engines damaged by ingestion of foreign objects dur-
ing the past 12 months.
The ingestion of flight deck debris, tire particles,
birds and damage resulting from refueling operations
accounted for 20% of the engines damaged by iden-
tified objects. The remaining reports reflect items of
hardware, tools, test equipment, wearing apparel,
engine and aircraft parts and support equipment,
indicating either careless handling, improper main-
tenance practices or inadequate quality control
methods.
Friend or Foe?
Aboard or ashore the ingestion of ground safety
pins has become the number 1 problem area. An
average of 2 engines per month are damaged this
way.
One outfit reports a J65 just 12 hours out of over-
haul swallowing a canopy safety pin. Damage cost
$15,000—right expensive for just 12 hours of- its
normal 600 hours of operation. Furthermore, the out-
fit experienced 3 out of 4 FODs in a 4-week period
because engines had ingested canopy safety pins!
Don't you be embarrassed
approach/February 1963
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The total costs of such damage is incalculable
when one considers the loss of life and injuries in-
volved in FOD-induced accidents, property damage,
shipping charges, mission unreadiness and so on.
There's no doubt about the problem being a serious
one. It merits everyone's attention. What can you
do about it?
Program Monitoring
First, a realistic FOD prevention program must
be in effect.
The following action should be taken through as-
signment of specific responsibilities to squadron per-
sonnel by the FOD Prevention Officer. Checklists
should be prepared for monitoring the program.
Housekeeping
:
(a) Following quarters each day, a FOD walk-
down should be conducted of the entire squadron
area. All objects which could cause damage, such
as metal, stones, wood,
. . .
should be removed.
Personnel should report any existing or potential
FOD hazard, e.g., chipped or deteriorated concrete,
to the FOD Prevention Officer.
(b) Prior to flight operations each day, a follow-
up inspection should be made by an assigned in-
dividual and a formal report be made to the FOD
Prevention Officer regarding any discrepancies.
(c) During the aircraft secure check at the close
of day, insure that duct and exhaust nozzle covers
are in place and loose objects are removed from the
area.
(d) At least once a week, clear the line area of all
aircraft and support equipment. Sweep down with
both the vacuum and magnetic sweepers.
(e) When runways, taxi strips or decks are in a
condition which might result in FOD, a report
should be made to the Commanding Officer of the
station or ship concerned with recommendations as
appropriate.
(f) Remove loose objects from all rolling stock
and support equipment utilized in the vicinity of jet
engines or aircraft.
(g) Inspect and clear the ramp area of all foreign
objects within a 75-foot radius of the aircraft prior
to each preflight, daily inspection and turnup of the
engine. Particular attention should be given to for-
eign objects in the pad-eyes.
(h) Inspect and clear the high-power turn-up ramp
area of all foreign objects within a 150-foot radius
of the aircraft prior to turn-up.
(i) Provide containers for loose objects picked up
on FOD prevention and have them placed in strategic
and accessible locations.
Maintenance:
(a) Properly install inlet duct and exhaust nozzle
covers on all aircraft engines not scheduled to be
flown. Be certain duct covers are intact and all com-
ponent parts are secure. This also applies to aircraft
in hangars.
(b) After preparation of the engine for installa-
tion, clean the engine exterior with a vacuum cleaner
Differences in FOD Prevention
FOD occurrence, removal and rejection rates are
considered to be unacceptable. Since the major causes
of FOD are poor maintenance and housekeeping
practices, FOD is an unnecessary waste. Material
availability and cost are adversely affected. In recog-
nition of the problem, G. E. in cooperation with Bu-
Weps activities, developed a program to investigate,
define problem areas and initiate or recommend the
necessary action to reduce FOD rates on the Navy
J79 engines.
Investigation results showed activities with low
FOD rates had:
All personnel sensitive to the problem
Directives in place—specifics
Directives implemented daily—formally
Foreign object checks—3 times daily
Duct covers used
Screens used
Ramps and taxi area clean
Activities with high FOD rates:
Personnel were not sensitive to the problem






Ramp and taxi areas
—
poor.
Effect: Activities with effective prevention pro-
grams and program management have about 1/7 the





Readers have requested the specifications for
the "Bazooka"—a homemade vacuum cleaner
which appeared in March '57 APPROACH. Here
they are along with a brief description: The
Bazooka is small enough to be carried in a hand
tool box. It is inexpensive and easy to manu-
facture from materials normally on hand with-
in a squadron. It is particularly useful in clean-
ing residue such as rivets, filings, wire clip-
pings and dirt from ducts, airframes and cock-
pits. It's a handy gadget for FOD prevention.
Mechanics find the homemade compressed-air-operated
vacuum cleaner handy for cleanup after-service-changes.
Here are specifications for manufacturing your own "Bazooka." The tool has been in use by the O & R at Norfolk since 1949,
Winter FOD Guards
GUARDING against foreign object damage
to aircraft engines must be a round-the-clock
effort, shared by everyone. While this is a round-
the-calendar job, winter ice brings unusual
problems which require precautions both on
the ground and in the air. Not only must
ground crews keep runways properly cleared
of ice, snow, and slush, but aircrews must give
special attention to operation at altitudes where
icing conditions may occur. Starting anti-icing
equipment after the plane has passed through
the area and acquired a thick coat of ice may
loosen hard chunks which could be ingested.
Jet aircrews, therefore, must be particularly
alert to have their anti-icing turned on before
they enter the danger zone.
to remove loose objects. If rollover rings are avail-
able, rotate the engine 360° clockwise and counter-
clockwise.
(c) Conduct an FOD prevention inspection and
sign an FOD prevention clearance on any aircraft
which has received hangar maintenance work be-
fore that aircraft is returned to the line.
(d) When an engine is changed, the inlet ducts
and engine compartment should be cleaned and in-
spected prior to installing the engine. The airframe
should be inspected to insure that all loose bolts,
nuts, washers, cotter pins, tools, lock-wire and other
debris are removed. After the engine installation is
completed and prior to buttoning-up the aircraft, the
inlet ducts and engine compartment should be in-
spected for the presence of foreign objects. Quality
Control and Maintenance personnel should insure
that this has been done prior to signing inspection
forms and checklist "sign-off" sheets.
(e) Do not at any time use the intake duct as a
shelf for articles of any description.
(f) Do not lay sound helmets, tools, or any per-
sonal gear on an aircraft.
(g) Personnel working in or adjacent to intakes
or cooling air ducts should remove pencils, tools,
rags and all objects from shirt pockets prior to such
work. (These items represent approximately 2.V r of
the objects found which caused FOD )
.
(h) Personnel should not enter the aircraft park-
ing area during flight operations or during periods
of engine turn-up with any type of headgear on other
than a sound attenuator with the chinstrap properly
fastened.
li) Perform thorough pre-turn-up and post-turn-up
inspection of ducts and engine cavities. Remove
shoes prior to entering duct.
(j) Inspect the ramp area adjacent to and in close
proximity to the aircraft preflighting area. The area
immediately aft of the aircraft should be inspected
also to prevent damage to other aircraft from Foreign
objects blown up by the jet blast.
ikl Any aircraft/engine to be turned-up for main-
tenance checks, preventive maintenance or operation
of electrical or electronic equipment should have
intake duct mesh screen covers installed and they
should remain installed until the aircraft is com-
pletely shut down.
ll) Hold the minimum possible revolutions per
minute during turn-up on the line and while taxiing
in order to reduce the probability of ingesting foreign
objects.
I ml Consideration should be given to handling
aircraft in such a manner that blast effects on parked
aircraft are kept to a minimum.
( n ) Do not taxi across another aircraft's intake
or exhaust blast area, or in the propeller wash of
reciprocating aircraft.
(o) Maintain proper taxi interval.
(p) Maintain proper takeoff interval.
Compliance to FOD prevention directives is man-
datory—failure to do so, is negligence.
In summary:
Foreign Object Damage is waste.
Good maintenance practices and good housekeep-
ing are the most significant factors in the prevention
effort.
FOD Prevention is an all hands responsibility.
So, as one oldtimer said, "there ain't no such thing as an isolated case! If it
happened once, it can happen again, and again. . . ."
Whether you're flying an aircraft fresh out of check today, or are the line
chief ordering two pulled in for periodics, take heed to isolated cases of missing tools.
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DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR SACET
Misuse of Ordnance on Jet Aircraft
"D ECENT attempts to utilize practice bombs un-
suitable for the aircraft involved resulted in the
total loss of one I A 4D-2N ) and minor damage to two
others.* Underlying the events which led to this iso-
lated but serious accident was an unfortunate misin-
terpretation of the appropriate regulatory documents
together with certain assumptions which turned out
to be invalid.
The documents concerned included Ordnance Pub-
lication OP-2216, Aircraft Armament Bulletin No.
161, NWL Report 1802, and the flight manual for
the aircraft concerned. The assumptions made were
to the effect that since the use of the bomb in ques-
tion was not specifically prohibited for use on this
aircraft, and had the same basic shape and con-
struction as the one cleared for use, and apparently
had been used by another squadron—Let's use it.
The result, to quote was:
"What appeared to be a minor variation in ord-
nance loads from that prescribed in the flight manual
proved to be of such a magnitude to cost the Navy
44 a first line aircraft."
Each of the documents previously mentioned serves
a specific purpose. OP-2216 contains general and
specific information regarding bombs and fuses.
AAB-161 deals with flight restrictions imposed on
externally carried bombs stemming from functional
or structural limitations of the ordnance items them-
selves, and is valid primarily for ordnance to be car-
ried on reciprocating engine aircraft. The Naval
Weapons Facility (Dahlgren) Report 1802 was a
survey to determine the current use, availability, and
requirements for practice bombs to aid in the de-
termination of the adequacy of stockpiled practice
bombs and requirements for the future. As for the
flight manuals, at present, most of the manuals for
the older types of service aircraft list only jettison
and release instructions for stores that cannot be
used to the full limit of the aircraft inflight envelope.
Restrictions on the use of aircraft ordnance are
based on extensive flight testing to determine func-
tional and structural limitations as well as separa-
tion characteristics of the various bomb/aircraft
combinations. To verify, publish and maintain cur-
By CDR G. R. Otis
Aircraft Project Coordination Office, BuWeps
rent a compilation of all possible combinations of ord-
nance for all service aircraft would be prohibitive
from a budgetary standpoint. A more logical approach
to the problem is to modify the flight manuals of each
model aircraft to incorporate a supplementary table
of ordnance items which have been tested and are
authorized for carriage and release.
Such tables are already included in the flight
manuals of the F-4 I F4H I and A-5 (A3J). Supple-
ments have been recently added to the manuals of the
A-4 (A4D) F-3 (F3H) F-4 (F4H| and AF-11E
series aircraft for the same purpose. Similar action
i- being taken for all othei service aircraft as appli-
cable. Thu>. the Aircraft Flight Manual is intended
to he the basic authority for use of ordnance on each
molel aircraft. Bureau approval must be obtained if
deviation from the flight manual is desired. BuWeps
instruction to this effect is being issued.
Checklist
Checklist to prevent jettison of external stores while
performing preflight tests.
\^ Conduct electrical tests in accordance with ap-
plicable HMI.
i^ Assure all ordnance switches off or safe posi-
tion.
Safety pins installed in all ejector racks with
external stores. . _—_—
_
Remove breech caps and cartridges from all
ejector racks.




^ Apply external power. —
^ Check primary circuit
ter.
1^ Check emergency circuit using breech cap test-
er, assure circuit is broken at all stations when
emergency handle is stowed. -
\^ All ordnance switches off or safe position.
\^ Replace safety pins.
*A Mk 65 Mod 500 WSF Practice Bomb was substituted
for a Mk 66 1000 WSF Practice Bomb for use on an Aero 7A-1
Bomb Ejector Rack on the A-4C aircraft The bomb disintegrated
upon release.
V* Remove external power from aircraft.
^ Replace cartridges and breech caps.
\^ Secure all fairings and doors on ejector racks.







AS I was driving an NC-5 starting unit down the
flight line at night, another NC-5 came into my path.
To avoid hitting the vehicle and possibly killing the
driver, I had to cut hard right and ran into an F8U
tail section. I would recommend that small running
lights be installed on the side of the NC-5 and similar
units, as an aid to better night vision. —MUGS
Beat Murphy's Law
INCIDENTS have been cited wherein chip de-
tector warning lights have been reversed indicating
false malfunction of the wrong engine. It has been
found that the port sump lights have been wired to
the starboard engine and vice versa, when P2 (P2V)
ASC-861 is incorporated.
Accordingly, a functional test inspection of the
system should be conducted. Inspection may be con-
ducted by grounding magnetic sump plug wire and
viewing correct indicating light.
Cat Hook-Ups
THE human element involved in hook-up of an
airplane on a catapult is one of the most important
factors affecting the success or failure of a launch;
consequently, special emphasis must be placed on the
human factor when providing a hook-up procedure
which will be as satisfactory and as fool-proof as
possible.
Human efficiency deteriorates after long hours of
continuous operation especially when this operation
is continued after dark. Time between launches must
be realistic in order to provide enough time for hook-
up and thorough inspection of both the hold-back and
catapult hook areas. Lighting improvements in the
catapult hook and holdback areas to aid night visual
check were investigated in USS FORRESTAL during
mid-June 1962 and test results were satisfactory.
Consideration was also given to adoption of
standardized physical hook-up and inspection pro-
cedures for each airplane model. It was suggested
a thorough check of the bridle be conducted as fol-
lows: Upon application of the tension load, each man
responsible for the bridle terminal hook-up check for
tension in each bridle leg by shaking the bridle
laterally. Each man should then insure the bridle
terminal is properly seated by placing a hand on the
catapult hook point. If the point cannot be felt then
the bridle is mispositioned. A third man (or perhaps,
a senior or final checker) should be utilized to insure
proper hook-up at the bridle apex/shuttle area by
using the same physical method. This third man
should also recheck both bridle terminals to provide
a double check.
—
NATC Patuxent River, Md.
Electrical Grounding
ELECTRICAL grounding must never be taken
lightly. Many points which appear ideal for attach-
ing ground wires may be undesirable because of a
(coating of oil, grease, paint or other material. There-
fore, the attachment of ground wires should be made
Ito points of best grounding with the least chance
Jof producing a high resistance connection.
I For parking purposes a single ground wire of
^suitable length may be okay in some smaller air-
I planes but not adequate for servicing and main-
tenance operations. In the case of an airplane such




"GOOD" connections, by ordinary standards can-
not in all cases carry the load. The terminals must be
PERFECT.
There is no reserve carrying capacity or margin
of contact to carry juice through dirty, distorted, im-
properly stacked or insufficiently torqued terminals.
Many of the problems attributed to the devices in-
volved have been boiled down to simply poor tech-
nique at the connections.
Our only fix is to be sure every terminal is perfect
—all workmanship and torquing must be as outlined
by maintenance instructions—the overefficient na-
ture of electrical apparatus demands it. •
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Change of Designations
Where possible aircraft model
designations are changed in keep-





Rescue" Nov. 1962 is a fine and well
deserved tribute to LT Paul Franken-
berger and hi* crew. However, it fails
to give the richly deserved credit for
a night helicopter recovery from I s>
kearsarce, then CVA-33, which oc-
curred early in 1956 in the Far East.
Perhaps records of the KEARSARCl
can give you the names, date>. and
other detail* which 1 cannot, except the
pilot may have been LT B. Willar Hy-
ing an HU-1, shown in the 55-56
kearsarce Cruise Book. I have long
since forgotten the name of the pilot
for certain, but his feat and personal
disregard for his own safety will not
be forgotten by any of us who wit-
nessed the incident.
It occurred while we were steaming
through the fringes of a typhoon. The
sun porch, now gone on the modernized
kearsarce, was the lookout point for
a few intrigued by the thrill of waves
almost engulfing the bow. One finally
did. Several men were injured and one
was washed over the side. He was
severely injured by the time he found
himself clear of the ship.
Fortunately, a bow lookout saw him
go, and a trailing destroyer was alerted
and able to spot him visually in the last
few moments of twilight, and hold him
in a searchlight beam as darkness fell.
The seas were too high to come
alongside or to lower a boat, and a
helicopter was dispatched, coughing
and sputtering with no warm-up before
leaving the deck. The helicopter crew-
man had to lower himself into the
water, place the injured man in the
sling, and then climb back up to the
helicopter hand-over-hand. The pilot
elected to leave the man hanging in the
sling while bringing him back to the
carrier, where he raised and lowered
the helicopter in motion with the pitch-
ing deck while the man was removed
from the sling and placed into a
stretcher.
The pilot and crewman received their
acknowledgement from those "f us
that night in a thundering ovation thai
drowned oul the noise of the storm.
Tiny deserve much better than to lose
it now in the first line "I youi recent
article.
I). (.. FISH, II
• We said "in what is believed
to be the first night helicopter re-
covery from a ship." (Had to hear
of another one.
Buddy Store Info
FPO, San Franrisco—In reply to
your request for "Buddj Store Info."
page 16 of the November, 1962. \p-
PROACH.
Recently in our All! iAD-6) squa-
dron, one of our pilots brought a bud-
dy store with trailing hose aboard when
unable to retract or jettison the hose.
The decision to bring the A1H aircraft,
with malfunctioning store, aboard was
based upon our LSOs previously hav-
ing waved such an aircraft aboard suc-
cessfully. In both cases, the LSO had
the pilot fly a slightly high, on speed
approach and cut him for a no. 3 or 4
wire. The trailing hose and basket hit
the ramp and, as the aircraft was ar-
APPROACH welcomes letters from its
readers. All letters should be signed
though names will be withheld on re-
quest. Address: APPROACH Editor, U S.
Naval Aviation Safety Center, NAS
Norfolk, Va. Views expressed are
those of the writers and do not imply
endorsement by the U. S. Naval Avia-
tion Safety Center.
rested, came forward slightly curling,
under the fuselage. No aircraft damage
oi i urred in eithei instance and st
damage was limited to the hose and
basket.
Our LSO, qualified to wave all Ai
Group types, feels thai in event of i
bolter with any of these types, thei
deceleration of the aircraft is not suffi-
cient to allow enough flailing of the
licse to cause damage on the flight deck.
Our pilots generallj agree that bring-
ing tin- ailing -Ion-- hark aboard -hip
i- a Rafe and sensible practice.
I). A. PACE
wiation safety oi hi
va-165
Visual Aid
FPO, San Francisco—Present air-
craft paint specification- of gray andl
while provide- little contract unde
conditions of limited and reduced vis
bility. In order to provide improved 1
pilot reference for formation flight in
dense clouds and at night it is recom-
mended that a design be painted along,
the longitudinal axis of all AID e
ternal fuel tanks. Any design with
long ordinate dimension should proved
effective.
A dark or bright colored design pro-
vides a reference discernable at consid-
erable distance during periods of re-
duced visibility and in dense clouds is
often the only reference. A4D fuselage
lights illuminate the tank and seeming-
ly project the design giving much more
than a point on the lead aircraft. A
design also permits ready identification
of squadron aircraft at night aboard
'
ship and in rendezvous areas in close
proximity. Any thermal hazard from
weapons detonation is considered to be
of negligible consequences.
If the design is in the squadron
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colors it adds the individuality to the
squadron's aircraft which is difficult to
achieve under the present paint codes.
We use a facsimile of a bird with a
long tail.—See photo.
Painting can be allowed and ac-
complished within the fine interpreta-
tion of painting specifications which
prohibit the painting of designs on air-
craft. A4D external fuel tanks are truly
not part of the aircraft but carried
stores.
This scpjadron has found the painted
fuel tank to be an important aid in
all weather and night formation flight.
R. F. SCHOULTZ
CO. VA-93
• It does serve the purpose of
increasing visibility at night and
in clouds but might be objection-
able when used during an actual
combat mission.
Know Before You Go
FPO New York—HS-U realizes that
even with the new improved SH-3A
(HSS-2) Sea-King helicopter, ditching
drills are important.
Despite the most advanced safety
features installed in modern aircraft,
experienced aviators recognize that ac-
cidents can happen. Since a helicopter
crew has no parachutes, proper ditching
(escaping from an aircraft which has
made a forced water landing) tech-
niques are more important than for
crews of fixed-wing aircraft.
The Sea-King was designed to float
on a moderate sea. But fire, a leak in
the hull, unusual landing attitude, or
other factors could cause the ship to
leak. These drills, therefore, can save
lives.
Escaping through the Sea-King's
hatches involves more than just jump-
ing out a window. When a man is wear-
ing his winter Mark V anti-exposure
suit, a survival pistol and holster, a
PR-2 one-man life raft, a knee board
and his mae west, getting through a
small hatch successfully can be a prob-
lem. Several pilots discovered that
extraneous gear sticking out of un-
zippered pockets hindered their escape.
Under actual ditching condition, this
could be serious.
Blinders are taped over helmet gog-
gles to simulate complete darkness,
How Do Housef lies Land on Ceiling?
SCIENTISTS have long conjec-
tured on how houseflies accomplish
such a seemingly intricate maneuver
as landing on a ceiling.
Some thought the fly comes in
head-first and upside down. Others
studied flies and thought they de-
tected a half-roll before landing.
High-speed photography has come
up with the answer. The fly ap-
parently can land several different
ways.
The photos show that in the ty-
pical landing on the ceiling the
insect approaches the ceiling at a
near vertical angle. At about one
body's length from lighting, it thrusts
all six feet forward, its two fore-
feet poised like a diver's arms.
The cushioned and sticky fore-
feet absorb the impact as the fly
humps its body forward to bring
the other four legs into their four-
point landing.
Details of the fly's long-held secret
and the instrumentation required
to record it are reported in Science,
a weekly semi-technical publication
of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. Author of
the report is William G. Hyzer, con-
sulting research engineer, of Janes-
ville, Wisconsin.
It's a dead-stick landing in that
the fly's motor stops its propeller
(wings) just before the impact.
The pictures offered solace for
proponents of the half-roll theory.
Some variations in the landing man-
euver were observed, he reported.
In one, the fly went into a rolling
movement immediately before touch-
ing down with its forefeet.
The final phase of this maneuver,
he noted, resembled a sidewise
handspring, or "cartwheel," and
could account for the half-roll inter-
pretation advanced by earlier ob-
servers.
Hyzer also timed the impact speed
of ceiling landings at a "typical"
velocity of 25 centimeters a second,




• You dear reader may find this
useful during a lull in the happy
hour conversation. But it's really
just a gimmick to plug another
serious landing problem—Ramp
Strikes, page 1.
since the Sea-King is an all-weather,
day or night aircraft.
Ditching drills are performed with
more than routine interest by pilots and
crewmen, they want to know their way
out in a hurry—if they ditch there




The skipper initiates ditching drills bv being the first to exit from the bird.
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g-OTCSS o oj Our product is safety, our process is education, and our profit is measurec
in the preservation of lives and equipment and increased mission readiness
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The
Mystery of Aviation Safety
By Brigadier General L. B. Robertshaw, USMC
Commander. MARTCom
"C'ach year the potential readiness of our Marine Air Reserve progresses almost
•*-^ routinely as a result of planned programs. The tangible improvements become
obvious. However, among our greatest efforts, but least obvious of our contributions
to Readiness, is our aviation safety program. The purpose of our program is to
safeguard lives and prevent aircraft accidents—without jeopardizing readiness.
Peculiarly, almost mysteriously, the results of aviation safety sometimes appear
to be in inverse proportion to the safety effort. For example, I have seen occasions
when the Class A accident rate has spiraled upward right in the middle of a vigorous
aviation safety campaign. On other occasions I have seen the personal efforts of a
commander apparently disregarded by acts of gross negligence. Therein lies the
mystery. Sure, it's discouraging but not nullifying. Every effort pays off, somehow.
No course of medicine ever assured the elimination of sudden and sometimes unex-
plained death, and people haven't given up the study and practice of oral hygiene
simply because it has failed to eliminate cavities and loss of teeth.
So, in aviation, where the prevention of accidents and the safeguarding of lives
is essential, we must continuously improve our education, knowledge and attitude as
professional aviators and aviation personnel through the study and practice of aviation
safety. The pilots and crews who fly the planes, those who maintain and control them,
and those who provide essential services for aircrews and equipment are the ones
who will either cause accidents
—
or prevent them. Everyone involved must take a
continuous and active, personal part in aviation safety education and practice—re-
gardless of apparent results.
2d MAW's "HOT DOPE" Sheet
A safety pin
is a safety pin is a safety pin. .
.
A cotter pin is also a 'safety' pin!
BOTH are simple, inexpensive.
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